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"It is the nature of things to be unequal. One is worth 
twice, or five times, or ten, or a hundred, or a thousand, 
or ten thousand times as much as another. To think of 
them as equal is to upset the whole scheme of things. Who 
would make shoes if big ones were the same price as small 
ones?"
Mencius ; Discourses 
Circa 300 B.C.
"The value or worth of a man is. . .his price - that is to 
say, so much as would be given for the use of his power."
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
1651
"Equity is a roughish thing; for law we have a measure. 
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is 
chancellor; and as that is large or narrower, so is 
equity."
John Selden: Table Talk 
1689
"He who pays the piper can call the tune."
John Ray: English Proverbs 
1670
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The State of Montana is currently pursuing its statuto­
ry mandate for pay equity by implementing a new, point 
factoring method of job evaluation. An anticipated re­
straint on its successful implementation is the classifica­
tion grievance process operated by the Board of Personnel 
Appeals in the Department of Labor and Industry. In its 
laudable efforts to balance the interests of management and 
labor, the Board's decisions over time tend to threaten the 
consistency of the existing classification system.
The present study analyzes ways in which the role and 
rules of the Board might be altered so that employees' 
rights are protected while preserving the integrity of the 
new job evaluation system. Without such modifications the 
goal of pay equity cannot be achieved.
Based on the analyses reported here, the following 
recommendations are made:
1. The Board and their Hearings Examiners must 
develop and accept structures to assure that 
appropriate restraint is exercised in reviewing 
the decisions of job analysts.
2. Both the Board and its Hearings Examiners must 
acquire a greater understanding of and appreci­
ation for the application of the job evaluation 
methods of the Classification Bureau.
vii
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V l l l
3. A number of changes of the Administrative Rules 
of Montana governing the classification griev­
ance process are needed. Among these are :
(a) changes to narrow and make more explicit
the grounds upon which a grievance is 
based;
(b) changes to improve the quality of job
information provided by the grieving 
employee;
(c) changes to make available a less formal
investigatory process as an alternative to 
a quasi-judicial hearing; and
(d) changes to add flexibility to the remedies
offered by the Board.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this paper is to describe the current 
pay grievance process available to state employees, to 
analyze its weaknesses, and to recommend reforms of the 
process that would both preserve employee rights and allow 
pursuit of Montana's statutory goal of comparable worth. 
The critical assumptions made in this effort are: first,
that job evaluation technology in Montana government has 
grown in sophistication and acceptance beyond the limited 
approaches of the current grievance process; second, that 
the general goal of good government in Montana will be 
enhanced by grievance reforms that reduce the costs of the 
process while preserving employees' right to consistent 
treatment and management's right to manage; and, third, that 
Montana law requires pursuit of a far more explicit model of 
job evaluation than can be fairly or appropriately grieved 
within the grievance process as it now operates.
While dissatisfaction with Montana's pay grievance 
system has been voiced in the past, the addition of the goal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of comparable worth for state employees has added a 
new urgency to the case for grievance reform. The current 
grievance process is operating as an alternative classifi­
cation system with unspecified rules of circumstance and 
inappropriate principles of compromise. Until the griev­
ance process is nothing more nor less than a guarantee that 
job evaluation is done consistently and in line with the 
state's established methods of job evaluation, it will be a 
major barrier to the Department of Administration in its 
mandate to assure similar pay for similar work for all 
state classified employees.
Given the historical conflict in labor-management 
relations in Montana, it is assumed here that a relatively 
formal, quasi-judicial process with the involvement of an 
outside arbitrator such as the Board of Personnel Appeals 
is proper for Montana's government employees. The case 
will be made however, that unnecessary "legalism" can and 
should be removed from the process and that the time is 
right to revise the pay grievance process to reduce costs 
and improve outcomes while allowing the advance of job 
evaluation in Montana to a higher, more explicit level.
The Comparable Worth Context
In spite of the many voices in opposition to it, the 
theory of comparable worth with its closely related pay 
equity techniques has advanced steadily, though increment­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ally, in the decade of the 1980s. The persistence of the 
debate over comparable worth as an objective in public 
sector organizations suggests that no sweeping mandate 
equivalent to the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 may 
soon be realized. Still, just as equal pay for equal work 
was adopted by individual public jurisdictions before 
federal adoption of the principle, so too has the principle 
of equal pay for comparable work been adopted by various 
public jurisdictions. The state of Montana joined this 
growing stream in 1983 with passage of a law establishing 
the objective of comparable worth in the evaluation of state 
jobs.^
The notion of comparable worth is best understood as a 
two-tiered policy issue. At one level comparable worth 
poses major social policy questions regarding systemic 
discrimination against minorities and women in the work­
place. At this level comparable worth is defined broadly as
2the elimination of racial or gender consideration in 
determining the rate of compensation for a job. The main 
topics of the debate at this level are primarily socio­
economic. Questions are raised as to whether the discrim­
ination is self-imposed or socially imposed on women and 
minorities in the educational and career choices they make? 
and whether the pay differences are most appropriately 
addressed by new corrective social policy or existing 
affirmative action approaches that promise to allow women
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3and minorities to enter higher paying occupations.
The other level of the comparable worth policy issue
concerns operationalizing the concept. It is at this level
that public personnel practitioners have focused most of
their attention. Perhaps the best operational definition
of comparable worth is provided by Helen Remick:
The application of a single bias-free point 
factor evaluation system within a given 
establishment, across job famili&s, both to 
rank-order jobs and to set salaries.
This operational or pay equity aspect of comparable 
worth generates a quite different - though related - set of 
concerns than does the broader socio-economic aspect descri­
bed above. Well documented in a wide range of research and 
literature,  ̂these concerns include: (a) questions about the
technical plausibility of a job evaluation system that meets 
the rather restrictive terms posited by Remick; (b) contro­
versy over who should choose the values and weights upon 
which the factor evaluation will be based; (c) concerns 
about which evaluative factors will be included or excluded 
and how they will be defined; (d) questions about job 
analysis both as to accuracy of the information and the 
added workload of supplying useable information to job 
analysts; (e) questions about fair implementation of equity 
based corrections ;  ̂ and, (f) concerns about the cost feasi­
bility of such corrections.
Every public jurisdiction operates with a somewhat
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
unique blend of policy, law and process pertaining to job 
evaluation and pay. The addition of pay equity to a juris­
diction's particular compensation formula raises a variety 
of issues - many of which may be still unseen - that may 
represent effective barriers to realization of the 
comparable worth concept. If public organizations such as 
the state of Montana are to meet the objective of pay 
equity, all the implications of that goal on present policy, 
laws, rules and methods must be identified so that plans can 
be laid and any necessary adjustments made.
Thus, a central question that will be addressed 
throughout this paper is whether the present pay grievance 
process can be adapted to a job evaluation method built on 
the lines prescribed by Remick and other comparable worth 
advocates. The Remick prescription, as summarized earlier, 
demands job evaluation that is both open and explicit about 
the value judgments utilized and precise and reliable about 
the consistency and comparability of job evaluation results. 
As the State of Montana moves toward implementation of a pay 
equity approach, there is increasing urgency to the question 
of whether the existing grievance mechanism can be modified 
to accommodate the mandated change. This paper will contend 
that such changes are unquestionably feasible and consider­
able explanation will be put forth to suggest the direction 
of the needed reforms.
While the subject of pay grievance processes in general
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
has not been extensively studied in the personnel litera­
ture, Montana's process was reviewed by the Governor's 
Personnel and Labor Relations Study Commission in 1982.  ̂
The staff reports and the commission's final report on the 
grievance issue provide a diagnosis and a suggested pres­
cription for a number of ills in the process. In many 
areas, the problems with the grievance process identified in 
1982 correlate with the adjustments that will be needed to 
adapt the grievance process to a job evaluation method that 
meets the pay equity standard. Indeed, the method of 
quantified job evaluation proposed for Montana is a direct
outgrowth of the prescription for improvements made by the
8Personnel and Labor Relations Study Commission. For that
reason, it follows that the scope of this paper necessarily 
will include a discussion of both long-standing problems 
with Montana's classification and wage grievance process and 
anticipated problems or adjustments associated with imple­
mentation of the proposed Benchmark Factoring Method {BFM) 
of job evaluation.
Chapter Outline
Following the introductory chapter. Chapter II discus­
ses the central issue of the paper in the larger context of 
public personnel administration. In the third chapter the 
discussion turns to the purpose and evolution of the classi­
fication grievance process in Montana state government, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
historical criticisms of the process, and an argument that 
reform of the process is still needed.
In the fourth chapter, various proposals are detailed 
for addressing perceived flaws in the present appeals 
system. The discussion will include necessary changes in 
law, rules, policy, procedures and approaches as they relate 
to various reform prescriptions.
Chapter V takes up the problem of accommodating a new, 
comparable worth job evaluation method, the Benchmark 
Factoring Method, within the existing grievance structure. 
The discussion centers on the feasibility of and strategy 
for implementing the changes identified. It also suggests 
the consequences of not implementing such changes. Finally, 
Chapter V summarizes and concludes the arguments contained 
in this paper.
In this effort, there is no presumption that the 
changes discussed here will perfect the grievance mechanism 
used in Montana. Nor is the question raised as to whether 
employees should have a grievance process available to them 
on matters of pay. The purpose here is simply to attempt to 
contribute to the evolution of Montana's young, centralized 
classification and pay system. The addition of pay equity 
as an objective of this classification system poses new 
challenges that will be outlined in the next chapter and 
that will only be met by a good-faith effort to recognize 
the need for change and to adapt to it.




^Montana Code Annotated, 2-18-208 and 209.
2The addition of racial as well as gender consideration 
to the notion of comparable worth is somewhat recent in most 
of the research and literature in this field. A working 
paper on the extent of pay discrimination toward minorities 
has been released in the fall of 1986 by Center for Women in 
Government, State University of New York at Albany, Drapper 
302, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York. This study
is based on a recently concluded exhaustive comparable worth 
study by the state of New York.
^For an excellent and terse summary of the comparable 
worth debate primarily on this socio-economic level, see 
"The Comparable Worth Controversy" in New Perspectives, 
Spring, 1985, p. 28-31.
4Helen Remick, "The Comparable Worth Controversy", 
Public Personnel Management, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter, 1981, 
p. 377.
5See particularly: Tewolde Habtemicael, "Equal Pay for 
Work of Comparable Worth and the Case of Montana State 
Government," (Masters of Public Administration, Professional 
paper. University of Montana, 1985); p. 32-35 for a compre­
hensive discussion of the numerous barriers to implementing 
pay equity plans.
^This is perhaps the widest reaching area of concern 
and, at the same time, the least documented. At issue here 
are such questions as whether only female dominated job 
classes should receive pay increases; whether only those 
classes subject to or not subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement should receive increases; whether so called 
"overpaid" classes should simply be frozen or reduced until 
others catch up; and whether the salaries of all employees 
should be protected from a decrease until they leave the 
position. It is likely that no general answer can be 
reached to these kind of questions since the circumstances 
of the particular jurisdiction tend to dictate their answer.
^Montana Department of Administration, Personnel
Division, Personnel and Labor Relations Study Commission r
ReprocJucecJ with permission of the copyright owner. Further reprocJuction prohibitecJ without permission.
Recommended Improvements to Montana State Personnel and 
Labor Relations Systems ̂ Final Report to Governor Ted 
Schwinden and the 48th Session of the Montana State Legis­
lature, December, 1982.
®Ibid, p. 20-21.
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CHAPTER II
JOB EVALUATION IN THE CONTEXT 
OF COMPARABLE WORTH
The rights of people at work in government have expand­
ed dramatically both in number and in kind over the past 
twenty-five years. An outgrowth of both the civil rights 
movement and the union movement, this expansion of employee 
rights has increasingly taken the center stage in the public 
personnel arena. Indeed, the growth and relative power of 
personnel sections in governmental organizations has risen 
as a direct result of ever expanding equality of opportunity 
and employee rights within management systems. Where the 
public personnelist in the United States was once primarily 
only management's agent for procuring or discharging employ­
ees, today she is the keeper of due process and the arbiter 
of equity in wide ranging labor-management relations.
In the relatively brief period of the past thirty 
years, American public service has moved in its approach to 
employee rights from a rigid "doctrine of privilege"  ̂ to an 
era of due process so extensive that doctrine and principles 
have been replaced by individual case law precedents and 
dynamic "rules of thumb." While once able to define public
10
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employment as a privilege subject to removal and to the 
arbitrary terms of management, the public employer today 
faces courts, laws and employees with an expanding notion of 
the rights of people who work for government.
The premise underlying this current era of due process 
in employment relations was well summarized by a federal 
court in 1966. In Hunter v. Ann Arbor, the court found that 
due process was necessary prior to the dismissal of a city 
employee :
When the effects of government action on the 
individual's interest are so wide ranging and 
basic, it is a constitutional requirement that the 
government's action not be based on certain typ^s 
of motives and that it have some rational basis.
The central objective of this paper is a prescription 
for the maintenance of a fair and responsible employee 
grievance process for challenging pay decisions in a state 
government setting in which gender-free pay equity or comp­
arable worth is an explicit goal. This objective can only 
be properly understood in the context of the present era of 
due process and widely expanded employee rights. It is the 
premise of the discussion here that the two components of 
this prescription —  first, that there should be a mechanism 
for grieving pay and job evaluation decisions and, second, 
that a governmental employer can and should use a pay equity 
model as a basis for setting salaries —  may be in direct 
conflict. Before detailing this premise of inherent con­
flict, the genesis of each component should be examined
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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beginning first with the notion of pay equity in the public 
sector.
Pay Equity in Montana State Government
In 1983, the Montana State Legislature enacted into law 
Senate Bill 425. The bill directed the Department of Admin­
istration to:
work toward the goal of establishing a standard of 
equal pay for comparable worth. This standard for 
the classification plan shall be reached by: 1)
eliminating, in the classification of positions 
the use of judgments and factors that contain 
inherent biases based on sex; and 2) comparing, in 
the classification of positions, the factors for 
determining job worth across occupational groups 
whenever^ those groups are dominated by males or 
females.
Additionally, the law requires the department to: 
report to the legislature the status of the study 
of the comparable worth standard and the extent to 
which Montana's classification plan and pay 
schedules adhere to or fall short of the standard 
of equal pay for comparable worth. The department 
shall make recommendations to the legislature as 
to what impediments exist to meeting this stand­
ard. The department shall continue to make such 
reports until the standard is met.
Sponsored primarily by two prominent female senators, 
this law was particularly advocated by women's rights groups 
and, more generally, by public sector unions.  ̂ The debate 
over the law was largely educational and not confronta­
tional. Most legislators simply sought information about 
the concept and the law passed both houses with relative 
bipartisan ease.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The policy guidelines offered in the law to the Depart­
ment, though somewhat obtuse, are along the lines of the 
standard for pay equity described by Helen Remick and cited 
in Chapter I. To meet the guidelines of the law the depart­
ment would seemingly need to "work toward the goal" of 
establishing Remick's "single, bias-free point factor 
evaluation system within a given establishment, across job 
families both to rank-order jobs and to set salaries.
By adding Section 208, which requires a report to each 
legislature on the progress of the Department "until the
7standard is met", the legislature did two things: (1) it
specifically endorsed the notion that study and progress 
toward the goal should take more than a couple of years 
since the legislature meets biennially; and (2) it effect­
ively gave permission to the executive branch to proceed on 
the road to comparable worth at whatever pace it might 
choose. While this section of the law does require desir­
able accountability of the executive branch in pursuit of 
the goal, it clearly weakens the state's legal commitment to 
comparable worth since it allows room for postponing pro­
gress indefinitely.
The state's commitment to comparable worth can thus be 
characterized as guarded, if not ambiguous. Still, the 
approach of the state's Classification Bureau has been to 
strive directly toward Remick's prescription for pay equity. 
While the efforts of the Bureau have been successful in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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terms of developing a workable job evaluation system that
meets Remick's parameters, the Chief of the Bureau, John
McEwen, has noted: "We have found that arriving at a system
that is agreeable to a variety of interests (i.e., workers,
managers, policy makers and public interest groups) is both
8technically and politically hazardous and difficult."
The political hazards and difficulties encountered by 
the Classification Bureau in its pay equity efforts stem 
from the ambiguous commitment of the legislature, the 
executive branch, the unions, and women's groups to the 
concept of comparable worth. The technical difficulties 
derive essentially from the perceived effects of the more 
rigorous and explicit job evaluation criteria called for by 
Remick upon unions, managers, politicians and employees with 
an interest in the operation of the job evaluation system.
The political difficulties relate to matters that are 
largely outside this paper, and have been documented else-
9where. Still, some of the more notable sources of inde­
cision over pursuit of pay equity in Montana can be summar­
ized as follows:
1. The cost ramifications are not clear to the policy 
makers.
2. The law itself sends a mixed message to the Department 
of Administration as described above.
3. Unions and some non-organized employees have tried to 
gain from comparable worth revisions without losing any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the advantages they have enjoyed in the current 
classification system.
4. The concept of comparable worth is relatively new and 
discussions of job evaluation are almost always con­
fused and controversial. As a result many of the 
actors in the process of changing Montana's classifi­
cation system are either ignorant, suspicious, mis­
informed or openly hostile.
5. The advocates of the comparable worth policy objective 
have been generally ineffective in Montana. Especially 
in terms of the more technical, operational dimension 
of pay equity, women's groups and unions have been 
largely silent at best and off the mark at worst.
6. Unlike jurisdictions such as the state of Washington
and the city of San Jose, California, Montana has not
had a headline-grabbing court challenge to its pay 
11practices. As a result, the benefits of educating
the public and politicians while politicizing the issue 
through the media have not been realized.
Certainly all these issues in combination contribute to 
the resistance encountered by the State in its efforts to 
implement a pay equity approach. Perhaps the most important 
factor, though, is the momentum of the status quo in the 
area of job evaluation and pay. One of the directors of a 
large state agency, for example, has been quoted in reaction 
to proposals to implement a pay equity approach: "Besides
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the fact that it is the right thing to do, why should we do
it?" Indeed, the general status of job evaluation, even
before the era of comparable worth, has been cited as an
example of Chris Argyris' organization psuedo-effectiveness
- "a state in which no discomfort is reported but in which,
12upon diagnosis, ineffectiveness is found."
The technical difficulties causing delay in implement­
ing comparable worth are at once both more profound and more 
subtle than the political problems. The effect of adding 
structure and explicitness to an existing classification 
system predictably causes turmoil for all actors in the 
system. The problems that arise in this effort stem from 
the nature of job evaluation in public organizations. 
Moreover, these problems illustrate that the so called 
"technical dimension" of job evaluation readily touches 
political nerves within a public organization.
In the section that follows, the history of job evalu­
ation and the assessment of its effects and defects will be
presented. The purpose of this discussion is two-fold; to 
suggest behavioral reasons why any proposal to change job 
evaluation methods that promises greater consistency and 
explicitness will attract opposition; and to establish the 
context from which the many issues pertaining to job evalu­
ation grievances arise. In short, the nature of job evalu­
ation in public organizations must be detailed to fully 
comprehend why efforts to change it or to grieve its results
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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are fraught with contention. When that foundation is laid, 
the discussion will turn to the specifics of the pay griev­
ance mechanism used in Montana’s state government.
Job Evaluation: Its Genesis and Controversies
The role of job evaluation in public organizations has
been and continues to be widely disputed. Its proponents
have argued that it adds stability, efficiency, management
capacity and a degree of democracy to the workings of 
13government. The detractors of job evaluation have argued 
convincingly that job evaluation limits vital management 
flexibility, fosters conflict, and creates a separate dimen­
sion of dysfunctional activities designed to circumvent it. 
As Jay Shafritz has succinctly argued:
...it has long been thought that the classifi­
cation process could aid in revealing organiza­
tional defects; yet upon closer observation it 
becomes obvious that it is frequently the classi­
fication system itself that creates these defects.
As control devices, position classifications are 
doubly unsuccessful. First, they prevent program 
managers from having the discretion essential for 
the optimum success of their mission. Second, 
they generate an astounding amount of dysfunc­
tional activity whose sole purpose is to get round 
the control devices. While the controls are 
frequently and successfully circumvented, the 
costs of such activity take ay^y resources from 
the organization’s prime goals.
A review of the history of job evaluation illustrates 
the unique and contentious role of the practice long before 
the era of comparable worth. Primarily an American inven­
tion, modern job evaluation was developed by the scientific
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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management advocates of the early 1900s. In their effort to
find the one best way to efficiently manage organizations,
the scientific management school developed approaches to job
evaluation that were similar in many respects to the time
and motion studies that they also pioneered. Like tasks
that could be broken into small steps to be carried out by
specialized machines, the scientific managers viewed jobs as
abstract collections of duties that could be performed by
15interchangeable workers.
While the scientific management practitioners developed
the basic techniques of modern job evaluation, its spread
throughout government organizations is a result of the civil
service reform movement which began late in the 1800s.
Intent on obtaining what has been called the "quest for
16neutral competence," the civil service reformers saw job 
evaluation as a way to further separate and insulate poli­
tics from the administration of government.
As Stahl has observed, the job evaluation model devel­
oped in the United States in the early 1900s represented a 
democratic and egalitarian reform of management practices.
In Europe, by contrast, job evaluation and pay practices 
were based on the social rank of the employee. A person's 
pay was largely a reflection of her status rather than her 
duties and responsibilities. By focussing on the work 
performed rather than the person performing the work, the 
American model promised equal pay for equal work to employ-
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ees and greater efficiency to employers. At the same time 
the model reflected the ascendent American political and
social value of egalitarianism.
The principles of job evaluation explicated by the 
civil service reforms were reflected in the 1920 report of 
the Congressional Joint Commission on Reclassification and 
Pay ;
1. That positions and not individuals should be classi­
fied .
2. That the duties and responsibilities pertaining to a 
position constitute the outstanding characteristics 
that distinguish the position from, or mark its simi­
larity to, other positions.
3. That qualifications in respect to education, experi­
ence, knowledge, and skill necessary for the perform­
ance of certain duties are determined by the nature of 
those duties. Therefore, the qualifications for a 
position are important factors in the determination of 
the classification of a position.
4. That the individual characteristics of an employee 
occupying a position should have no bearing on the 
classification of the position.
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5. That persons holding positions in the same class should
be considered equally qualified for any other position
18in that class.
The basic features of job evaluation systems stemming 
from the efforts of the civil service reformers are:
1) Job Analysis - Positions are studied by gathering 
detailed information about the work performed 
through interviews, observations and/or review of 
documentation such as position descriptions and 
organizational charts.
2) Factoring or Allocation of Jobs - When job-content 
is established, pre-established standards are 
applied to the job to determine comparability. 
These standards are typically either compensable 
factors, class specifications or a combination of 
both. In systems such as Montana's, which use the 
traditional approach to job evaluation known as 
position classification, jobs are allocated to the 
most appropriate class on the basis of comparison 
to various class specifications.
3) Relating Job Evaluation Results to a Pay Schedule 
- Once the job has been evaluated and/or allocated 
to a class, a pre-determined schedule will convert 
the result to a pay grade. In some job evaluation 
schemes this process consists of conversion of
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point scores to a pay grade. In traditional 
classification systems grades are assigned to 
classes in advance based on comparability between 
classes or market surveys of prevailing wages.
At first glance, the process of job evaluation is 
simple, logical and uncomplicated. As the critics of the 
process have argued, however, its simplicity may be its 
greatest shortcoming. This criticism is supported by the 
history of job evaluation. In essence, the developmental 
history of job evaluation ended around 1920 despite the fact 
that job evaluation practices have flourished and are now 
pervasive in public and private organizations. As Shafritz 
has argued, while organizational theory and management 
techniques have marched on, job evaluation has remained 
static.  ̂̂
It is true that a number of technical advances have 
improved the reliability and acceptability of job evaluation 
methods since 1920, but the scientific management premises 
upon which these methods rest, have not changed. Shafritz 
details a wide range of "dysfunctional" activity spawned by 
the failure of job evaluation to adapt to advances in indus­
trial psychology and other social sciences:
Because the most basic doctrines of position 
classification were established prior to World War 
II, current practices effectively ignore many of 
the advances in management science and theory that 
have occurred since then. What other professional
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field of endeavor in the United States is so 
backward? A physician couldn't practice medicine 
today with the medical knowledge of the 1920s. An 
engineer or architect could not design very much 
for today's world limited to the technology of the 
1930s. Yet this is exactly what public personnel 
administrators are doing to the employees of their 
jurisdictions - engaging in a presumably profess­
ional practice while using a technology and tools 
that are 40 years out of date. While position 
classification was widely hailed as a managerial 
tool that would promote equity, it has retained 
its popularity long after the fiction of its 
equity has been exposed, because of its usefulness 
as a control device. Obviously, this is ineffic­
ient.
Even if one accepts only the direction of Shafritz's 
argument and not its every tenant, it is clear at a minimum, 
that there are divergent interests in the outcomes of job 
evaluation. The major interested parties and their likely 
behavior in a job evaluation system can be summarized as 
follows :
Managers and Supervisors
Managers and supervisors want a job evaluation system that
simplifies pay practices and work assignment planning
while allowing them near total flexibility in applying it.
Their concern is far less for equal pay for equal work,
than it is for optimal pay for those who work for them.
Toward the latter end, they will spend hours embellishing
and re-embellishing job descriptions, organizing and
reorganizing work units and as Shafritz argues, even lying
21to obtain their objectives. Yet, when invited to
provide input into the standards upon which job evalua­
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tions are based or to comment on an evaluation that they 
do not care about, the same managers often find they have 
neither the time nor the knowledge to do so.
Employees
Employees are especially skeptical of the attempt of job 
evaluation to separate the person from the position. They 
know that they bring ideas, approaches and skills to their 
tasks that set them apart even while the job evaluation 
methodology systematically says their jobs are the same as 
others. They generally have a greater interest in equity 
than supervisors. In most cases, even if they are indiff­
erent about the criteria used, employees will accept the 
evaluation of their job to the extent that they perceive
it to be equitable with the evaluation of the jobs of co-
22workers with which they are familiar.
Since the bottom line of job evaluation is the setting of 
salaries, a certain portion of workers with a financial 
need will challenge or game the job evaluation system to 
obtain a pay raise. Thus, the attitude of employees 
toward changes in the methods of a job evaluation system 
is based primarily on their perception of the equity of 
the results of the change and, secondarily on the effect 
of the changes on their own pay.
Public Employee Unions
Public employee unions typically contend that management 
controlled job evaluation systems are inherently unfair
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
and should be the subject of collective bargaining. They
contend that fairness and consensus about the relative
worth of jobs can only be established within the legal
framework of collective bargaining agreements. Few public
employers, however, are obligated to bargain job evalu- 
23ation. In most settings, the operation of the job
evaluation method is portrayed by unions as a management 
prerogative from which employees need protection. As a 
result, unions have attempted to sell membership in the 
union partly on the basis of services provided to employ­
ees in protecting their interests under the job evaluation 
system. In Montana and other states, these services 
include providing counsel to union members who grieve 
their classification and influencing the development of 
job evaluation standards and rules. In Montana, the 
interest of a given union in changes to the system of job 
evaluation appears to reflect whether that union has 
successfully obtained the desired results from the exist­
ing approach or whether they perceive an opportunity to 
improve their position from the changes. Those unions 
that have extensively shaped the hierarchy of jobs to the
advantage of their members through the grievance process
24have been most steadfast in their opposition to change.
Job Analysts
The practioners of job evaluation - job analysts - tend to 
develop an attitude of "job evaluation right or wrong."
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As the columnist, Mike Royko, has observed
"It is the firm conviction of many people who have 
spent years studying problems of pay administration 
that there is only one way to do position classifi­
cation, and that is to do it right-full, one- 
hundred percent, applied-to-every-case, right. It 
means, especially doing it right when it hurts-when 
it means, for example, losing a valuable employee, 
or not being able to hire an outstanding candidate, 
or causing someone a financial hardship or when it 
just means a bit of extra work for the bosses.
Over the long haul, an organization benefits from 
facing up to such unpleasant decisions... The point 
may seem lost at times, but there is a great deal 
to be said for the argument that the classification 
function best serves an organization when._its
technical decisions are always made to stick".
To the extent that they take their jobs and themselves
seriously, job analysts inevitably develop the belief that 
the job evaluation system, if applied with righteous 
consistency, will produce benefits for the organization. 
Still, to the degree that they are aware of the dysfunc­
tional activity which they seem to ignite wherever they 
go, job analysts often come to recognize the need for and 
advantages of change and improvement. Indeed, cycles of 
change in job evaluation methods have become the hallmark 
of most job evaluation schemes in state governments.^^ 
Job analysts typically seek ways to modify their methods 
to add flexibility and increase acceptability by managers 
and employees, while preserving the larger mandate of 
equity and consistency. As a part-time technician of
change hoping to marginally improve the job evaluation 
machinery, the job analyst can use the promise of "a 
better way" to deflect resistance and address dysfunc-
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tional activity.
No matter what method of job evaluation is used by an 
organization, the process rests on a series of subjective 
judgements. The job analyst in most jurisdictions deter­
mines the relative worth of a job on the basis of a number 
of discreet, evaluative criteria. These criteria, called 
compensable factors, are of necessity defined only generally 
and are thus open to recurring debate. Typically, the 
factors include
" the kind of work and the knowledge and skills 
necessary to perform it;
° the latitude with which the work is carried out;
° the degree of control and review exercised with 
respect to the product;
° the consequences of the work, or the responsibility 
it carries;
® the degree to which direction of the work of others 
is entailed; and 
° the ultimate accountability and relationship to 
other activities that are involved.
While this list of factors is only a general represen­
tation of those used in most jurisdictions, it does suggest 
the subjectivity and open-endedness of the evaluation cri­
teria. Consider for instance the second criteria concerning 
the latitude with which the work is performed. The laundry- 
room worker might argue that she has complete latitude - 
that since her training period no one has ever intervened in 
her decisions about how she does her work. The budget 
analyst who seeks to rationalize and justify a $25 million 
budget would, if honest, concede that her work process is
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frequently reviewed by her supervisor and that the product 
of her work is scrutinized and often dramatically revised 
both within her organization and by the governor or the 
legislature.
Yet it is almost certain that the job analyst will rate
the budget analyst higher than the laundryroom worker in
terms of latitude. No matter what rationale is used for
doing so (and in most job evaluation systems there would be
2 8ample rationale available ), what is instructive about this
example is that, even in distinguishing widely divergent
occupations, a considerable degree of sophistication and
explanation is needed from the job evaluation method. If
the laundry-room worker happens to be dissatisfied with her
pay or her employer, and intent upon testing the "science"
of the job evaluation process, the degree of sophistication
29required will multiply and intensify.
Additionally, given the kinds of subjective decisions 
that lead to evaluation of a job, the credibility of the job 
analyst rather than the evaluation result itself can easily 
become the focus of contention. In nearly every case the 
holder of the job, the employee, is far more expert than the 
job analyst on all matters pertaining to her particular 
occupation. The job analyst knows the evaluation method; 
the laundry-room worker knows laundry. Conflict typically 
is heightened by an inherent language problem between job 
analyst and w o r k e r . W h i l e  the worker desperately wants to
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talk about how deserving she is of a pay increase, the job 
analyst responds with seemingly obscure and evasive inquir­
ies about latitude, consequence of error and task variety. 
When the occupation under review is highly skilled or 
technical, such as systems analysis or forensic chemistry, 
the credibility of the analyst in truly understanding the 
work tends quickly to become the point of contention rather 
than the proper evaluation of the job.
When one adds to these problems of subjectivity, 
language and analyst credibility, the divergent interests of 
the actors in the job evaluation system as explicated 
earlier, an equation for persistent conflict emerges. The 
discussion in the next chapter will suggest that a class­
ification grievance process can become perhaps the ultimate 
source of conflict and dysfunctional activity spawned by job 
evaluation. But, whether the issue is a grievance of a job 
evaluation decision, a change in job evaluation method, or 
whether a job evaluation system should be initiated, debate 
seems inevitable and along predictable lines. The outcome 
of the debate will vary according to the strengths and weak­
nesses of management, unions, employees and personnelists 
within a public organization and will offer an elucidating 
glimpse of the organization's internal workings and values.
Montana as a Case Study in Job Evaluation Revision
After just six years with a centralized job evaluation
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system in operation, Montana's State Personnel Division in 
1981, proposed adoption of a point-factoring job evaluation 
method to replace its existing qualitative approach. As 
earlier noted, this effort was initiated in part to comply 
with the state's comparable worth laws. It is of equal or 
greater significance, however, to note that major changes in 
Montana's system have been proposed almost from its 
beginning in 1975.
In 1978 the original point factoring approach was 
replaced by the existing qualitative, position classifica­
tion method. This change was conceived by the Classifica­
tion Bureau as a means of increasing the sophistication of 
job evaluation practices to make the system easier to 
defend. Within the first three years of adoption, Montana's 
system had attracted a wide range of increasingly valid 
challenges from the management of executive agencies, from 
employees both informally and through grievances, and from
employee unions through both grievances and collective 
31bargaining. The present qualitative system was adopted by 
the Classification Bureau with little fanfare or input from 
users.
For the most part, the 1978 revision was successful in 
making the system more defensible for two main reasons: 
first, new job evaluation factors added to the system raised 
the level of analysis and the language of decision-making 
used in comparing jobs to a degree of sophistication beyond
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that of the users of the system. The advantage in justify­
ing evaluations thus shifted back to the job analysts where 
it had been in the first year or two of implementing central 
job evaluation. Second, the system was still young enough 
that few users understood the implications of the changes. 
As a result, no particular opposition arose even after the 
users of the system discovered the changes engendered by the 
new system.
Just four years later, the banner for revision was 
raised again in the Personnel Division. This movement for 
change, which is still pending implementation, stemmed 
mainly from a Personnel and Labor Relations Study Commission 
formed by Governor Ted Schwinden soon after he was first 
elected governor in 1980. These proposals were more techni­
cal than the broad social, egalitarian objectives of compar­
able worth. The changes envisioned were based on the 
state's experience with job evaluation primarily from 1978 
until 1981. The problems addressed by this Study Commission 
(hereafter called, the Commission) are a near textbook
reflection of the controversies described in the prior
3 2section of this paper. Essentially, the Commission
reforms were aimed at five main criticisms of the existing 
system:
1. the decision-making process is too subjective;
2. the system is hard to understand and difficult to 
explain;
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3. the grade relationships are not equitable;
4. the system is not suitable for evaluation of all 
types of positions; and
335. the system is easy to manipulate.
The Commission's reform proposals reflect the concerns 
of the four major actors mentioned earlier - management, 
unions, employees and personnelists. The policy question of 
whether central classification should continue was largely a 
given assumption in the process. The Governor made it clear 
that the Commission was to speed the evolution of job evalu­
ation by designing major improvements to it. In Governor 
Schwinden's words in opening remarks to the Commission,
"It's past time for tinkering; we need a major overhaul in
3 4the state system.” The response of the Commission was a
clear reflection of this mandate. The Commission made the
following recommendations for change;
Maintain the current classification system and 
proceed with planned and existing efforts to 
enhance it by introducing quantitative methods 
where practical as quickly as time and resources 
allow. (Vote: passed unanimously).
Enhancement measures planned by the Personnel 
Division :
1. Phased introduction over a two and one-half 
year period of quantitative methods which will 
build on strengths of the current system (main­
taining the five primary factors of the current 
factor comparison method) but use the best features 
of the quantitative Factor Ranking and Hay Guide- 
chart methods. These include:
a. Separate but coordinated and consistent point 
factoring systems for major occupational 
groups to better meet the needs of each group
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as found in the Factor Ranking System.
Example: Group 1 - executive managers. Group
2 - professional, administrative and techni­
cal employees. Group 3 - labor, trades and
crafts. Group 4 - clerical, office machine
operators and technical employees. Group 5 - 
special occupations: physicians, attorneys,
teachers, law enforcement.
b. Use of classification advisory committees for
each occupational group comprised of agency 
representatives who are employed in, super­
vise, or are familiar with occupations in the 
group as found in the Hay Guidechart Method.
These advisory committees are to monitor the 
development of the factor ranking system prior 
to its implementation, assist the Personnel 
Division in evaluating classes, recommend 
grade levels for classes, and assist in 
allocating positions to classes.
2. Delegation of position classification author­
ity to agencies which demonstrate the capacity 
to exercise the authority coupled with post­
classification audits by the Personnel Div­
ision to maintain consistency across agencies.
3. Implementation of these measures with existing 
staff utilizing sta^| time saved by the 
delegation measure.
The Commission also studied the operation of the class­
ification grievance process in Montana, but in the last 
analysis was unable or unwilling to tackle the issue for 
reasons that will be discussed in the next chapter. Gen­
erally, the view seemed to prevail that by addressing 
problems within the job evaluation method most, if not all, 
the problems in the grievance process would subside.
It is now four years since the Commission issued its 
recommendations. The State Personnel Division has completed 
the process of developing the recommended quantified methods. 
Pay equity goals of comparable worth have been incorporated
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in the changes. Meanwhile, as the next chapter will suggest, 
many of the defects in the pay grievance process persist and 
no official effort to address them has materialized since 
1982, The prospects for implementing change in the grievance 
process, the job evaluation method, or both, remain unclear.
The Montana experience with reform of job evaluation 
suggests that the momentum for change is extremely difficult 
to maintain. At the outset in 1981 policy-makers and 
elected officials, unfamiliar with the history and nature of 
job evaluation, appeared determined and able to bring about 
needed reform. Their approach to the task was based on an 
erroneous willingness to view job evaluation as the 
equivalent of any other management system, such as those for 
purchasing or accounting. But, in Montana, as the various 
interest groups began to respond to the reform proposals, 
and the contentious nature of job evaluation materialized, 
the momentum for reform has steadily been depleted. The 
temptation to let lie the sleeping dragons of job evaluation 
has become nearly irresistible.
In the rest of this paper the case will be made that 
change in Montana’s job evaluation method and the related 
grievance process is vital and possible. The case for change 
of the method, having been well made by others, is here 
adopted as a premise. Even apart from the proposed change in 
job evaluation method, the need for reform of the formal 
grievance procedure is longstanding and should be pursued on
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its merits. The focus will thus turn to the pay grievance 
process with the following basic assumptions made:
1. That Montana's job evaluation practices have grown 
in sophistication and acceptance beyond the limited 
approaches used in the current grievance system;
2. That Montana law requires pursuit of a pay equity 
model that cannot be fairly grieved within the 
grievance mechanism as it now operates; and
3. That the goal of good government in Montana will be 
enhanced by grievance reforms that reduce the costs 
of the process to management and the appeals board 
while preserving management's right to assign work 
efficiently and employees' right to be treated 
consistently.
Chapter Summary
Dramatic changes in the public workplace stemming from 
the civil rights movement, the union movement and the work­
force itself have elevated the expectations and the actual 
rights of public workers. Like management practices for 
selection, advancement and discharge, pay practices have now 
entered the center stage of scrutiny primarily through the 
movement for comparable worth.
The pay practices of the State of Montana, which include 
an expansive formal employee grievance mechanism, have not 
escaped this scrutiny. A major effort has been ongoing in 
Montana to achieve both pay equity and technical improvement
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of its job evaluation system. To understand the issues 
raised and the difficulties encountered by this effort, and 
to understand the difficulties that can be expected in trying 
to revise the grievance process, a review of the history and 
nature of job evaluation is vital. Job evaluation, more than 
other central management systems is subjective and rife with 
disputes from all corners of an organization. Any proposal 
to change the formal grievance mechanism of Montana's job 
evaluation system must be informed by the relatively short 
history of job evaluation and pay grievances in Montana if 
the proposal is to have a serious chance of success.
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considerably more than they would on the state’s general 
plan. While this inequity still exists in the pay system, it 
may well have been the salvation of general classification 
since it allowed two employee groups with powerful union 
roots to deal with all pay issues through collective bar­
gaining rather than the classification grievance system. Had 
these groups been forced to fight classification in its 
infancy, the classification system may have been a much 
weaker process today - if it had survived at all.
32The most notable difference between Montana's exper­
ience from 1975 to 1981 and the normal controversies of job 
evaluation stem from its short history in the state. Prior 
to 1975, state agencies had a free hand in setting pay. When 
this discretion was lost, many agency managers resented 
centralization of pay setting. As a result, in the early 
years, managers were nearly as critical as employees. 
Indeed, many employee pay grievances in the initial years 
were encouraged and supported by agency management even 
though management had no direct access to the appeal process.
^^McEwen, p.2
^^Garry J. Moes, "Schwinden calls for 'Overhaul' of 
employee classification plan,” Great Falls, MT. The Great 
Falls Tribune, Wednesday, January 6, 1982.
g crPersonnel and Labor Relations Study Commission, 
"Recommended Improvements to Montana State Personnel and 
Labor Relations Systems," Helena, Montana, December 1982, p. 
21.
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CHAPTER III 
PAY GRIEVANCES IN MONTANA STATE GOVERNMENT
Overview
Given the degree of conflict and the potential for 
manipulation ascribed to job evaluation in the previous 
chapter, it is understandable that almost every job evalu­
ation system includes some kind of formal mechanism for 
challenging or appealing the results of the particular 
system. Experience of public organizations with job eval­
uation confirms the need for a grievance mechanism for two 
general reasons: 1) to protect employee's constitutional
rights to due process and practical interests in the job 
evaluation system; and 2) to provide an impetus for proper 
maintenance and use of the system by personnelists, managers 
and policy makers.
The first purpose, protection of the employee's rights 
and interests, is an obvious one. Few of the instruments of 
modern bureaucratic organizations strikes so personal and 
sensitive an area as the determination of one's pay. Pay 
decisions can never be fully dispassionate. The Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution assures that no person's 
life, liberty or property can be deprived without due
41
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process. As a quasi-judicial process, the pay grievance 
mechanism can provide this constitutional due process
guarantee.
In the American work force, an employee's level of pay
satisfaction is largely a matter of perception:
"...every man expects a certain relationship between, 
what he puts into his work in terms of effort, skill, 
etc., and his outcome, what he gets in terms of pay and 
other forms of satisfaction. When an individual 
compares himself to another person, he looks at his own
inputs and outcomes in relation to those of the other
person; for example, if two individuals receive the
same pay, but are unequally qualified, then both 
parties may suffer from cognitive dissonance, even the 
man who is relatively overpaid. The cognitive 
dissonance hypothesis includes a prediction that when 
people suffer from such dissonance, they take steps to 
reduce it."
Edward Lawler, Rensis Likert and others have shown that
pay dissatisfaction will predictably motivate employees to
action. Since pay satisfaction has been shown in various 
2studies to rest on one's perception of equity more than on
any expressed, rational basis of the level of pay, it
follows that pay dissatisfaction will befall any classifi­
cation system. The pay grievance mechanism channels the 
dissatisfaction toward some version of resolution.
The second purpose of a pay grievance mechanism has
more subtlety. Personnelists endorse and incorporate pay
grievance procedures because grievances are a source of 
corrective feed-back that allows the system to adjust to 
change in the workplace and to discover inequities that have 
been masked for any number of reasons. To illustrate.
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consider this list of a few of the more prominent benefits 
that a job evaluation system can gain from grievances:
1. An effective grievance channel can move deadlocked 
decisions on to resolution. Often, the burden of 
preparing position descriptions or disagreements 
over work assignments stifles the job evaluation 
process. Also, when agencies disagree with the 
evaluation decision they frequently resort to 
delay tactics that can be countered by an appeal 
mechanism.
2. The grievance process focuses decision-making on 
relevant, job evaluation criteria. Any job 
evaluation decision can be readily clouded by 
issues that seemed to an agency or supervisor to 
be related when, in reality, they are not. 
Frequently concerns about availability of budgeted 
funds , the performance, gender, race, personal­
ity, honesty or seniority of an employee, and/or 
collective bargaining issues will influence either 
the information provided for job analysis or the 
willingness of management to request a reclassi­
fication. By invoking the appeal process, the 
employee can bring the relevant job evaluation 
issues forward in a timely fashion while elimina­
ting the tangential issues peculiar to his or her 
organization.
3. The grievance process assists the job evaluation 
system by identifying changes in the duties of a 
job. Especially in an era of rapid adoption of 
new technologies, it is difficult for personnel- 
ists and even for supervisors to discover and 
understand the implications of change. If an 
agency does not routinely review the evaluation of 
their jobs, changes in the work can be identified 
and evaluated through an employee's grievance. 
Staying abreast of change is the relentless 
challenge for any job evaluation system and to the 
extent that grievances |id this effort, personnel- 
ists value the process.
4. Perhaps most importantly, an effective pay griev­
ance avenue adds credibility to the job evaluation 
process. Job evaluation systems, as described in 
Chapter II, must balance inherent subjectivity 
with consistency and equity. In short, the job 
evaluation process is glued together by system-
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ization. Personnelists who maintain the system thus value 
grievances to the extent that a complaint will reveal and 
eliminate an inconsistent evaluation. Again, the employee's 
perception that the evaluation system promotes equity and 
consistency is the key to pay satisfaction and satisfaction 
with the job evaluation system. At the same time, the 
number and kind of grievances in the job evaluation system 
can be an important form of feed-back to per sonne lists on 
the general effectiveness and acceptability of the 
evaluation system.
Origins and Structure of Montana's Classification Grievance 
Process
Montana's classification wage grievance procedure was 
born with the Classification and Pay Act passed by the 1973 
Legislature. The structure of the grievance process was 
heavily influenced by the politics of passage of the act. 
Montana has traditionally had a strong political role for 
both public and private unions - especially in comparison to 
other similar western states (see Appendix A). Because job 
evaluation is a management system which enhances the power 
and control of management, the unions representing Montana's 
state employees were, for many years, unwilling to support a 
centralized, job evaluation system.
The early 1970s was an era of sweeping state government 
reform and modernization in Montana. A new constitution was 
adopted and a major executive reorganization redesigned the 
structure of state operations. Following failed attempts in 
the 1950s and the 1960s to develop a job evaluation plan, 
interest was rekindled by the changes of the 1970s. At the
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same time, public employees saw the era as an opportunity to 
institutionalize public unionization by passage of one of 
the most comprehensive collective bargaining laws for public 
sector workers in the United States. Thus, the proposal for 
centralized job evaluation became a political bargaining 
chip defined as equal in value to the collective bargaining 
law.
The Collective Bargaining Act, passed by the 19 73 
Legislature, was not opposed by management primarily because 
union interests had agreed to support or not oppose the
5Classification and Pay Act. The existence of the Class­
ification and Pay Act provided insurance to management that 
collective bargaining would be structured and somewhat 
limited by vesting pay decision authority in the Department 
of Administration, The union's concern about the degree of 
unilateral control of pay setting by management was offset 
by the legislature in at least two ways: first, by provid­
ing in 1973 for a highly discretionary classification and 
pay grievance process to be administered by the Department 
of Labor and Industry; and second, by providing in 197 6 for 
mandatory bargaining of "Anything relevant to the 
determination of reasonable classifications and grade levels 
for state employees..."
The latter of these two approaches, the provision for 
mandatory bargaining of classification, was repealed by a 
later legislature. The impact of this brief period of
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mandatory bargaining substantially affects the present 
classification system in ways that are beyond the scope of 
this paper.^ The first approach, however, bears eminently 
on the topic here. To understand the criticisms of the 
grievance process that will be discussed later and to 
evaluate alternatives for changing the process, it is vital 
to acknowledge that the grievance process was designed 
largely for political expedience.
The 1973 Legislature created the Board of Personnel 
Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the BPA or the Board) to 
adjudicate and mediate disputes arising from either of the 
two companion bills on collective bargaining and job evalua­
tion. The BPA was attached to the Department of Labor and 
Industry for administrative purposes. In addition to 
serving as an arbitration and mediation service for public 
sector collective bargaining, the BPA was given the author­
ity to hear classification and wage grievances subject to a 
•'procedure to be prescribed by the Board".
The BPA is a five-member body. All members are appoin­
ted by the Governor and one member serves as chair. The 
Board is staffed by the Employment Relations Division of the 
Department of Labor and Industry which provides professional 
and support staff for mediation, arbitration, and the 
conduct of hearings. The first BPA developed a classifi­
cation and wage grievance process for adoption into the 
Administrative Rules of Montana. The procedure was imple-
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merited in 1975, the year that the state's first classifica­
tion plan came into service. Given the somewhat unusual 
dual role of the BPA as a review body for collective barg­
aining and classification, ̂  it is not surprising that the 
classification grievance process developed by the BPA is 
closely based on the grievance arbitration processes typic­
ally found in collective bargaining contracts. Collective 
bargaining grievance mechanisms were well documented and 
tested by years of experience and court challenges- The 
classification system, conversely, was a new and largely 
unknown process in Montana. Also, since the staff serving 
the BPA had to function in two areas, the original staff was 
chosen primarily for their experience in collective barg­
aining. Such experience, unlike classification experience, 
was available in the Montana job market and collective bar­
gaining was expected to dominate the Board in terms of the
8amount and importance of the work to be performed.
The classification and wage grievance process can be 
invoked at any time by any classified employee. Originally 
an appeal could be filed on any grounds believed by the 
employee or a group of employees in a particular class to be 
relevant to their proper classification. In 1981, the state 
legislature changed the law to eliminate the right to appeal 
the grade assigned to a job class. Also, the Board modified 
its original rules (see ARM 26.24.5) in 1981 to specify 
thirteen appealable classification issues. The employee can
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not change an appealable issue in a grievance after the 
appeal has been initiated unless the employee is willing to 
begin the process over. Grievances can be filed individ­
ually, or in groups. Group appeals must be approved by the 
Board prior to initiation.
Like most collective bargaining grievance processes, 
the classification and wage appeal process is organized into 
separate progressive steps. At each step in the process, if 
the employee is not satisfied with the response of manage­
ment, he or she may advance the appeal to the next step. 
The following is a brief description of each of the four 
steps in the Montana process:
Step I : In this initial step, the employee completes
the classification and wage grievance form specifying 
the appealable issues in contention and submits the 
form to the immediate supervisor. The immediate 
supervisor must respond on the form to the appeal 
request. If the immediate supervisor agrees with the 
employee's grievance, he or she may take action through 
the normal agency process to modify the classification 
of the position. If the immediate supervisor does not 
agree or if the requested action to upgrade a position 
is disapproved by the immediate supervisor's boss, the 
employee can elect to advance the grievance to Step II.
Step II: In the second step of the process, the appeal
is submitted to the agency director. The director, who 
is typically a member of the Governor's cabinet, can 
resolve the grievance by requesting reclassification of 
the position by the State Personnel Division. If the 
director does not agree with the employee, the employee 
may elect to advance the appeal to Step III.
Step III: At Step III, the employee advances the
appeal to the Classification Bureau of the State 
Personnel Division. The Classification Bureau typic­
ally assigns a job analyst who has not recently evalu­
ated the position under appeal, to investigate the 
appeal and issue the findings. The findings are
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usually presented in a five to fifteen page document 
detailing the application of the state's classification 
methodology to the employee's alleged grievance. If 
the employee concurs with these findings, the position 
is either reclassified or left in its present classi­
fication. The employee who disagrees with the Person­
nel Division's findings, may continue the appeal on to 
the Board of Personnel Appeals. The majority of 
classification appeals are resolved by this Step III 
investigation.
Step IV: When the BPA through the Employment Relations
Division of the Department of Labor and Industry 
receives an appeal at Step IV, the Board has the 
discretion to conduct a preliminary investigation of 
the grievance. The Board would then issue a prelim­
inary decision based on the findings of the investiga­
tion. Since this preliminary decision is non-binding, 
either the appellant or the Personnel Division may 
reject the findings and insist on a formal hearing. If 
both parties accept the preliminary decision, the 
grievance is resolved.
While preliminary decisions were used commonly in the 
early days of the classification appeals process, the 
Board has in recent years used preliminary decisions 
sparingly. Most commonly, cases advanced to Step IV 
proceed directly to a formal hearing. In a formal 
hearing the issues are limited to those identified at 
Step I in the appeals process.
At Step IV the classification and wage grievance 
becomes a matter strictly between the appellant or 
appellants and the Personnel Division. In effect, the 
Step IV process is designed to be a review of the 
Personnel Division's Step III response to the appeal. 
The agencies employing the appellant have no direct 
standing in a classification grievance hearing. 
Agencies typically work closely with the Personnel 
Division and obviously must be prepared to make any 
organizational or financial adjustments to accommodate 
the Board's final decision.
Classification hearings conducted by the Board operate 
under the guidelines of the Administrative Procedures 
Act and the Model Rules of the Attorney General. The 
only consequential guidelines to the Board's review in 
a hearing is found in ARM 24.26.513 which states, "If 
the preponderance of evidence taken at the hearing 
shows the employees aggrieved, the Board shall issue an 
order requiring action to resolve the employees'
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grievance."
After the conduct of the hearing the Board's hearings 
examiner issues Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and a Recommended Order to the parties. Either party 
may file formal exceptions to the hearings examiner's 
recommendation. These exceptions are heard in oral 
argument before the full, five-member Board of Person­
nel Appeals, By practice, hearings on exceptions by 
the full board are limited to reviews of procedural 
error by the hearings examiner or, on very rare occas­
ions, reviews of clearly erroneous decisions by a 
hearings examiner. Final decisions of the Board are 
determined by majority vote.
If either party continues to be dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Board of Personnel Appeals, they may 
continue the process by filing the case in State 
District Court, When a case enters the state court 
system, it is processed according to the law as inter­
preted by the court. Rulings by the court can, of 
course, directly or indirectly either overturn or 
enforce a decision of the Board of Personnel Appeals.
A Comparative Discussion of Job Evaluation Grievance Mecha­
nisms
As expected, the implementation of the state’s first 
central job evaluation system in 1975 generated a number of 
complaints, confrontations and criticisms from the various 
actors in the system. The grievance process adopted by the 
Board of Personnel Appeals attracted, early on, a substan­
tial portion of this discontent. Indeed, changes in the 
Classification and Pay Act of 1973 pertaining to grievances 
were made by the 1975 legislature even before the Act was 
implemented,
Some of the perceived deficiencies of the grievance 
process were actually reflections of defects in the first
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classification methods adopted by the Personnel Division. 
Other complaints stemmed from a variety of structural or 
design problems perceived to have been manifested over time. 
A final category of criticisms are those stemming from the 
practices of the Board in its first years of hearing class­
ification grievances.
The discussion of prescribed changes in the classifi­
cation grievance process which will follow must be prefaced 
by at least a listing if not a full explication of the
recurring criticisms and reform proposals directed toward 
that process since 1975. To address these criticisms, the 
discussion that follows will focus, first, on perceived 
design and structural problems, and second, on a variety of 
longstanding criticisms stemming from the decisions and
practices of the Board in its first several years. Problems 
deriving from defects in the state's job evaluation methods 
will be briefly discussed in Chapter IV.
Structural Criticisms
Variation is the norm in terms of the procedural
features of job evaluation grievance mechanisms. There is 
consensus that some form of structured review for appeal of 
job evaluation decisions is desirable, but the practitioners 
of job evaluation do not agree on the best design for such a 
process. Several factors tend to shape the kind of griev­
ance process adopted in a jurisdiction. Most prominent of
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these factors are:
1. The relative strength and pervasiveness of collec­
tive bargaining as a model for labor relations in 
a jurisdiction;
2. The era in which job evaluation was established in 
a jurisdiction;
3. The peculiar features of the job evaluation 
technology used in the jurisdiction - including 
the degree of credibility and the quality of the 
method as perceived by employees; and
4. The degree of trust or goodwill existing as part 
of the organizational culture of the jurisdiction.
It is possible to discuss in general terras the most 
common approaches to job evaluation grievances used by state 
and local governments. The objective of the discussion is 
to establish that workable options do exist and that the 
practices of other jurisdictions may indicate why certain 
problems stem from the design of Montana's approach. To 
streamline this discussion, the various approaches will be 
categorized into three basic models: the Civil Service
Model, the Collective Bargaining Model and the Personnel 
Board Model.
The Civil Service Model. This model stems from the 
civil service reform movement of the late 1800s. Grievance 
procedures in this category are primarily formal and quasi­
judicial. In most jurisdictions using this model, the
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grievance process is intended for resolution of all person­
nel disputes ranging from misconduct and termination to 
ethical infractions and pay questions. As a result, this 
model tends to offer less specialization and expertise in 
its review of job evaluation decisions since the hearings 
examiner and/or civil service body must handle a broad range 
of personnel disputes.
Like nearly every grievance mechanism, the civil 
service model is progressive. The process is designed to 
begin at the lowest levels of authority over the employee 
and to advance through graduated steps to succeeding levels 
of authority until it reaches the final authority level in 
the process. As Merrill Collett has noted, the civil 
service commission should be the final authority and if the 
jurisdiction has no commission the final authority should be 
the administrative chief of the jurisdiction. According to 
Collett, "Only on the grounds of fraud should appeals be
9allowed to the governing body directly."
The Collective Bargaining Model. This approach dates 
from the beginnings of collective bargaining in the public 
sector - largely a post World War II phenomena in the United 
States. Most jurisdictions using this approach, do so
because job evaluation is a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining. Indeed, a survey taken by the Montana Personnel 
Division in the early 1980s found that Montana was perhaps 
the only state voluntarily using a traditional collective
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bargaining arbitration process for classification griev­
ances.
The collective bargaining model, like the civil service 
model, is a progressive approach. Normally, there are three 
or four clearly defined steps in the process prior to final 
arbitration by the hearings examiner or labor board who 
represent an agency separate from that of the job evaluation 
agency. While the arbitration hearing itself is quasi­
judicial, the process at the early stages encourages inform­
ality. Unlike Montana's classification appeal process as 
described earlier, final decisions of an arbitrator or labor 
board can not be appealed to the court system.
The Personnel Board Model. This model is the most 
modern approach. It typically represents an adaptation of 
the civil service and collective bargaining grievance 
procedures specifically to the task of hearing job evalua­
tion disputes. Graduated steps are also utilized in this 
approach. The "reconsideration process" that follows from 
the state of Nebraska is procedurally typical of this 
approach :
007.01 Reconsideration Process. An employee or agency 
head may request reconsideration, in writing, of the 
classification of a position to the Director of Person­
nel and shall explain in detail the reasons for such a 
request. An employee request shall be forwarded 
through the agency head to the Director of Personnel. 
Implementation of any pay changes will be delayed until 
the reconsideration has been formally concluded.
007.OlA The Director of Personnel shall again 
review the position classification. Unless
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additional information is needed from the agency, 
the Director of Personnel shall forward a decision 
to the agency head within 20 workdays after 
receiving the request. If the reconsideration is 
initiated by the employee, the employee shall also 
receive a copy of the decision.
007.GIB If the employee or agency does not agree 
with the decision of the Director of Personnel, 
appeal of the classification may be made to the 
State Personnel Board. The appeal must be made 
within 10 workdays after the employee receives the 
Director of Personnel's decision. The appeal must 
be in writing and explain in detail the reasons 
for the appeal and include the Director of Person­
nel's decision.
007.OIC The Chairperson of the Board shall notify 
the employee or agency, in writing, of the time, 
date and place the appeal will be heard. The 
record of the appeal shall be included in the 
minutes of the Board meeting. The findings of the 
Board shall be final and binding for a period of 6 
months or until a substantial change in duties of 
the position occurs.
The features of this model are not easily generalized. 
Typically, however, it is distinguished from the other 
models by:
1) the absence of a quasi-judicial designation and 
greater informality in methods;
2) access to the process by management as well as 
employees ;
3) location of the review body within the same agency 
that executes job evaluation; and
4) membership on the Board by either a current 
personnel director or by persons with job evalua­
tion experience.
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Perhaps the foremost question in comparing and assess­
ing these three grievance models is the question of whether 
a procedure can protect the due process rights of an employ­
ee with a grievance. Kenneth Davis, a noted administrative 
law scholar, suggests that to protect due process rights any 
procedure, whether defined as quasi-judicial or informal, 
must at a minimum assure the following:
1. That each party should have a chance to know and 
confront the evidence and ideas of the other side.
2. That proceedings leading to a determination are 
always open.
3. That the body or person making the determination 
explicitly state the findings and reasons used in 
the determination.
4. That "systems of precedent should be developed and 
followed to improve, jthe quality of the justice in 
the determination."
Generally speaking, as the degree of distrust or 
tension builds between labor and management measures for 
formal and explicit protection of employee rights can be 
expected to increase. Given the background of Montana's 
entry into centralized job evaluation and its history of 
relatively powerful union groups, it is not surprising that 
Montana, relative to other states, has a highly formal, 
quasi-judicial classification grievance mechanism. There 
is, thus, little question that the due process rights of 
employees are protected in Montana's system. Yet, the 
protection of those rights has imposed an unnecessary cost 
on the system itself.
To fully appreciate the many dimensions of the problems
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of Montana's pay grievance mechanism that will be discussed
later in this chapter, it is important to understand that
classification grievances are handled in much the same way
that collective bargaining grievances are handled. The
grievance process in the collective bargaining model is the
engine of labor relations. Normally, it is always available
to each employee covered by a collective bargaining contract
who perceives that they have been aggrieved. Grievances, by
design, become "a part of the continuous collective bargain-
12ing process." Since collective bargaining agreements are 
necessarily written broadly, the grievance process is seen 
as an instrument to give life to the agreement by formaliz­
ing the on-going, give and take between employees and em­
ployers .
For that reason the arbitrator in a collective bargain­
ing grievance process has a critical and quite flexible 
role. Her job is to open and maintain the communication 
between the parties needed to preserve labor peace and to 
make the contract viable. To do so she must foster an ethic 
of compromise and accommodation so that both parties can 
protect their rights and interests within the terms of the 
contract. The arbitrator is less concerned about the kind 
of precedents set by a decision than about finding the most 
appropriate solution to a specific problem. In short, 
resolution through compromise is the essential attribute of 
collective bargaining grievance arbitration.
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The civil service model stems from a quite different 
tradition. Its primary aim is not labor peace, but the 
insulation of government administration from the excesses of 
politics. Toward this moralistic goal of "good government", 
grievance mechanisms were devised to determine whether evil 
such as nepotism, cronyism, influence peddling or retalia­
tion had caused otherwise "neutral" government workers to 
commit fraud or to neglect their duties. The search is for 
the odor of rot within the bureaucratic body with the 
expectation that if it is discovered it can and shall be 
removed.
As the era of due process has emerged, civil service 
bodies have increasingly acted as tribunals of organization­
al justice to protect workers from unfair treatment. They 
have become internal mechanisms of due process and just 
cause to validate or reverse the innumerable personnel 
actions affecting the careers of government workers. Much 
publicized in recent years have been civil service cases in 
which due process is used as a shield for "whistle blowers" 
who seek to reveal errors or fraud within government. 
Originally civil service processes accomplished much of the 
work done today by full-time personnel professionals. As 
the specialization in such personnel matters developed into 
a separate profession beginning in the early 1900s, the 
civil service structure increasingly became a kind of shadow 
to the personnel authority of the jurisdiction. In this
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context, civil service boards or commissions have tradition­
ally been composed of members with some identified measure 
of expertise in personnel law and practice.
The different backgrounds and purposes of the civil 
service model as opposed to the collective bargaining model 
is most apparent in the scope of review of the two kinds of 
bodies. A civil service model typically exercises review to 
discover evidence of error, negligence, fraud, or interest 
peddling rather than to forge a compromise with an arbitra­
tion remedy. As reviewers of personnel professionals, civil 
service bodies typically are expected, when they find 
evidence of incorrect actions, to return them to the person­
nel administrator with specific recommendations for correct­
ion. Unlike arbitrators under the collective bargaining 
model who see themselves in the middle between two inherent­
ly hostile parties - labor and management - the civil 
service commissioner or hearings examiner sees the role as 
one of peer review of personnel professionals.
The personnel board model, while a kind of hybrid of 
the other two models, is more like the civil service model 
in its basic philosophy. Indeed, this third, most modern 
approach, stems directly from recognition that as due 
process rights have expanded, all personnel activities 
benefit from "the second opinion" of a review body. As has 
been suggested in Chapter IX, in pay and job evaluation 
grievances, where the topic of debate is the often elusive
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and subjective details of job evaluation, the competence of 
the review body or officer in the field of job evaluation is 
critical. Since the object of the process is to determine 
whether a consistent and fair job evaluation decision has 
been made, the personnel board model recognizes that review­
ers must have a working appreciation of the rules, laws and 
methods applicable to job evaluation decisions.
The criticality of the makeup of the review body in a 
grievance process has been emphasized by a variety of 
practitioners of job evaluation. The importance of job 
evaluation expertise within the review process was empha­
sized in the Montana Personnel Division's December 1981 
report to the Personnel Labor Relations Study Commission on 
the classification appeals process:
Some of the states that have established a classifica­
tion appeals process have encountered the same problem 
of trying to maintain a classification system, while 
trusting appeals to persons not expert in the methodol­
ogy of that system. The head of Pennsylvania's person­
nel function has written that 'we have determined that 
it could be extremely hazardous to fix responsibility 
for classification with someone who has no knowledge of 
position classification.' Similarly, the head of 
personnel in Indiana has commented, 'it has been very 
frustrating for us to attempt to be consistent in our 
classification decisions and then have a non-technical 
appeals commission make the final decisions on classi­
fication ' .
In the next section, the discussion will turn to the 
recurring and most significant problems and criticisms that 
have been aimed at Montana's classification grievance 
process. Many of the design limitations and problems that
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have been discussed here will be pursued further through 
reference to the specifics of Montana's experience with 
classification grievances in the past eleven years.
Criticisms of the Role of the Board of Personnel Appeals
In this section the discussion turns to longstanding 
criticisms of Montana's job evaluation grievance mechanism. 
The perspective, again, is that of a job analyst and prac­
titioner before the state's Board of Personnel Appeals. As 
alluded to earlier, both management and employee represent­
atives have had serious misgivings about the state's classi­
fication grievance process from its inception in 1975. To 
its credit, many of these procedural complaints from the 
1970's have been resolved by the Board.
Like any new government operation, the classification 
appeal process has been refined by the lessons of experi­
ence. Two examples illustrate this progress. Originally 
the Board's rules and practices were lax on questions of 
timeliness. Deadlines were either not explicit or not 
enforced. Cases were prolonged by the Board's conduct of 
preliminary investigations by hearings examiners prior to 
the hearing. Also, since the Board was obligated to adjud­
icate and mediate collective bargaining disputes, classifi­
cation cases were routinely delayed and rescheduled. By 
the 1980s a backlog of more than one hundred cases had 
developed. The rules and practices of the Board were then
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tightened to improve timeliness. Working cooperatively with 
the State Personnel Division, employees and unions, the 
backlog and delays were eliminated by the Board's staff by 
the time that the Governor's personnel study commission 
issued its report in 1982.
Secondly, the Board's original rules were vague regard­
ing what constituted a valid grievance. Since there was 
only limited expertise in job evaluation in Montana when the 
system began in 1975, it is not surprising that the first 
Board was hardpressed to anticipate the legitimate reasons 
for filing a classification grievance. As experience was 
gained and classification methodology developed, both the 
State Personnel Division and employee unions recognized a 
need both to limit access to the process and to define 
specifically all the allowable grounds for appeal. The 
Board thus modified its rules in 1981 to add at ARM 
24.26.508 a list of thirteen "appealable issues" that must 
be cited by appellants. The new rules of 1981 further 
specified that appellants can argue only the issues cited at 
Step One of the process in any later steps or hearings on 
the grievance.
This change, along with a statutory amendment by the 
1981 legislature which disallowed appeal of the grade 
assigned to a job class, added previously unknown structure 
and relative predictability to the process. It also illu­
strated the willingness of the Board's staff to make necess—
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ary changes to accommodate the needs of the parties coming 
before it.
Despite the fact that the Board has made many important 
changes, when the Governor's Study Commission process began 
in 1981, the Classification Bureau of the State Personnel 
Division continued to advocate further reform. The Bureau's 
reform proposals were detailed in its report to the Commis­
sion.^^ At the time of the report, the Bureau's records 
showed that its decision at Step three was upheld by hear­
ings examiners nearly half of the time.
The great majority of grievances were resolved by 
upgrading appealed positions at Step three. The Bureau 
believed that this demonstrated willingness to upgrade more 
than half of the appellants at Step three indicated that 
few, if any, of the appellants continuing to a hearing 
should prevail. The Bureau felt that if the same job 
evaluation system was employed by the Board, the hearings 
examiners should, in almost every case, uphold the Bureau's 
decision. Thus, the Bureau's staff believed that the loss 
of more than half of its cases before the board was convinc­
ing evidence of a flawed grievance mechanism.
In the Bureau's report to the Commission it called for 
two main reforms;
1. Narrowing the scope of review in Step Four hear­
ings from a substantive, "secondary classifica­
tion" approach to a procedural review of the job 
analyst's work; and
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2, Improving dramatically the level of expertise of 
hearings examiners in application of the state's 
classification methods.
The response of the Board's staff to this report set
the tone during the five years since the Study Commission's
report. Essentially the Board's staff resisted the call for
a narrower scope of review by arguing that courts, in
interpreting the statute pertaining to the Board's role, had
ruled that the scope of the Board's review and remedy power
is not significantly limited by law. As for the alleged
lack of job evaluation expertise, the Board's staff asserted
that the State Personnel Division needed to document fully
all of its classification methodology before the Board could
be expected to master it. A consultant's study of Board
procedures completed just prior to the study commission, had
also concluded that the expertise problem was mostly the
fault of the Personnel Division and this reinforced the
14position of the Board on that issue. Finally, the Board
had in the early 1980s hired a former job analyst to 
specialize in classification hearings and it argued that 
this would improve the Board's ability to provide informed 
decisions.
The response of union interests as represented on the 
Commission and through testimony before the Commission was 
similarly negative. Primarily, union interests rejected the
call for change because:
1. They contended that the actual number of appeals
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was small and declining. They predicted that the 
then recent statutory change disallowing appeals 
of the grade assigned to a class would dramatic­
ally reduce the number of appeals in future years.
2, In addition to the above contention, they argued 
that even if the process could be said to be 
flawed or biased, it provided an invaluable and 
solitary outlet for employees discontent with their classification and pay.
3. They argued that the status quo approach to 
grievances had substantially proven its effect­
iveness by reclassifying and rearranging manage­
ment's original 1975 job rankings in a manner more 
acceptable to employees. This, they asserted, 
increased the workability and assured the future 
of central classification.
Essentially, union interests were inclined to favor the 
existing approach precisely because the Board's role was 
similar to its mediation and arbitration practices. Unions 
wanted and encouraged the Board to solve problems and 
guarantee the protection of employee interests rather than 
narrowly ruling on whether, in the classification of a 
position, the Personnel Division had deviated from the laws, 
rules, and normal methods of job evaluation. The appeal 
process had effectively created an alternative classifica­
tion system that more than half of the time offered 
decisions favorable to the unions.
For many reasons, when faced with a largely negative 
response, the Personnel Division reluctantly retreated from 
its 1981 call for reform of the grievance process. First, 
the Division was concerned that pressing for reform would 
detract from its effort to gain Commission support for
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changing the job evaluation method. A new job evaluation 
method was seen as the greater need, and Division staff 
believed that if a new methodology was implemented the need 
for changes in the Board's approach would become more 
obvious to all parties. Also, the Division pressed for the 
creation of a new Board to be attached to its own Department 
of Administration to replace the grievance hearing function 
of the Merit System Council which was terminated in 1982. 
The Division staff expected to see legislation creating such 
a board with the classification grievance authority trans­
ferred to it. The bill to execute this plan died in the 
1983 legislature, however.
In the years since the Commission's 1982 report, a 
number of events, grievances and trends support the conclu­
sion that the reforms called for by the Classification 
Bureau are still needed. First, the size of the problem 
seems approximately the same. The chart below shows the 
number of individual and group appeals at Step III for the 
period 1979 through 1986:
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Indi- 109 61 56 45 42 136 87 47
vidual
Appeals
Group 1 4 1 2  4 1 4 5 5 6
Appeals
The chart does indicate a general decline in the amount 
of grievance activity. Since the law was changed in 1981,
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the number of group appeals has dramatically dropped. But 
employees ̂ who previously may have formed a group prior to 
1981, are filing individual appeals that are either treated 
collectively at Step III or are grouped later by the Board 
for purposes of conducting one hearing for a number of 
similar jobs. This phenomena is behind the high number of 
individual appeals shown in 1984.
This trend actually has increased the work of the 
Personnel Division in the conduct of appeal investigations 
at Step III. While group appeals are normally investigated 
on the assumption that all the jobs of the group are nearly 
identical, the recent trend toward individually filed 
appeals causes the Division additional effort. The Division 
presently must respond to the peculiarities of each job - 
even when the differences are not significant in determining 
the class allocation.
More importantly, since the 1982 Commission report, the 
effort invested by the Classification Bureau in each invest­
igation has increased for a number reasons. First, in 
complying with the Commission's recommendation, the Classi­
fication Bureau published a methods and procedures manual in 
1982 and 1983. The existence of explicit methods and 
procedures, while assisting job analysts in guiding their 
judgments, has also increased the standards for precision 
and the extent of documentation required to justify a 
grievance response at Step III.
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Second, in the period from 1982 to 1984, the success
rate of the Classification Bureau in Step IV hearings
dropped from around 50 percent to approximately 2 5 percent. 
To recover this apparent loss of credibility before the 
Board's hearings examiners, the Personnel Division 1) 
expanded the scope of Step III investigation reports, 2)
routinely initiated procedures for legal discovery on all 
cases advancing to Step IV, 3) increased its use of attor­
neys - both as its counsel in hearings and in pleading
exceptions or defending decisions before the full Board or 
the courts, and 4) modified its relatively conciliatory past 
approach to grievances by using more witnesses from compar­
able jobs and generally judicializing the entire process.
Thus, while union interests argued before the study 
commission that classification grievances were of declining 
importance, the grievance process was consuming more and 
more of the resources of the Personnel Division in its 
effort merely to win at least half of the grievances brought 
to hearing. Investigation reports of job analysts that 
ranged from a one paragraph statement to a few typed pages 
in the period from 1975 to 1982, have ballooned to ten, 
fifteen and even more than 20 pages since 1982. One appeal 
investigation and report now commonly consumes three or four 
working days of a job analyst.
From the perspective of the Classification Bureau, the 
extra effort invested in appeal work has been fruitful.
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Statistics for 1985 and 1986 show that the success rate of
the Division at Step IV hearings has returned to nearly
fifty percent. The additional effort, however, is an
unnecessary cost that could have been at least partly
avoided if the Board would have voluntarily adopted the
reform suggestions offered by the Classification Bureau in
its 1981 report to the Commission. Escalation of the
grievance process in terms of legal formality also imposes a
cost on employees. As Elkouri and others have argued,
resolution of appeals at the earliest steps of the process
usually offers the most informal and meaningful answer to
14the employee.
The two reforms cited previously from the 1981 Classi­
fication Bureau report are still valid in 1987. The updated 
reform arguments are as follows :
1. The Board Should Limit Its Scope Of Review Both In 
Accepting Cases For Hearing And In Devising Remedies.
By persistently exercising unstructured discretion in 
its scope of review and remedy powers, the Board continues 
to function as a secondary or alternative classification 
authority. Though Montana's statute clearly gives direct 
classification authority only to the Department of Admini­
stration, the Board has consistently taken that authority 
away by hearing invalid cases, by requiring and ruling on 
substantive testimony and evidence pertaining to job evalu­
ation information, and by providing discretionary remedies
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such as changing class standards, inventing job classes and 
assigning them to grade levels, and ordering upgrades of 
appellant positions based on comparisons to other positions 
that are not correctly classified.
The effects of wide-ranging, substantive review upon
the classification bureau are extensive, though not obvious 
to most casual observers. As Chapter II indicates, job 
evaluation is a judgmental process. Each decision in the 
process is based on previous decisions or standards which in 
turn become new standards for future decisions. When an 
outside party such as the Board makes "alien" job evaluation 
decisions, the very links that allow a job evaluation method 
to be systematic are undone. The result is that 1) the 
intended relationship between jobs changes, 2) the criteria 
upon which job analysts base their judgements are at best 
muddied, and at worst, lost, and 3) the chain reaction 
process known in the personnel field as "grade creep" is 
escalated at great financial burden to the state and its 
taxpayers.
The Classification Bureau proposed several changes to 
the Commission that would have restrained the scope of the 
Board's review. In practice this restraint could be realiz­
ed through the following:
a. Hearings examiners could more rigorously hold the
burden of proof in a hearing firmly on the employ­
ee/appellant. The Board's rules currently place
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this burden on the appellant by requiring the 
appellant to prove her case with a preponderance 
of the evidence. Despite these rules, in numerous 
cases, hearings examiners have ruled for the 
appellant and ordered upgrades on the basis of 
such things as a single supportive position 
comparison or one piece of testimony that is not 
fully rebutted by the Personnel Division. Rather 
than acknowledge the reality that the Personnel 
Division can most often produce more relevant 
evidence merely as a result of greater access and 
familiarity with the subject matter, some hearings 
examiners have seemingly tried to balance the 
"mismatch" by making rulings for the appellant 
based on marginal or insufficient evidence,
b. Hearings examiners could adopt a standard for 
review based on consistency of an appealed classi­
fication decision with similar past decisions. In 
many cases, hearings examiners have done so, but 
no clear standard of review is apparent in the 
Board's case histories since 1975. The point here 
is that rather than intervening as a secondary 
classifier, the hearings examiner could better 
serve the process by judging whether an employee's 
job has been treated the same as other similar 
jobs. Questions of whether all the similar jobs
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are treated fairly, or equitably as defined by the 
hearings examiner would be addressed as part of 
the decision, but left out in fashioning a remedy. 
Such restraint would simply acknowledge that 
ultimate classification authority by statute lies 
with the Department of Administration,
c. Hearings examiners could dramatically alter the 
disruptive impacts of grievance results by devis­
ing more creative and restrained remedies. With 
but few exceptions, the Board’s hearings examiners 
have tended to use a simplistic formula in decid­
ing cases. If they find the party aggrieved in 
the way that the appellant contended to have been 
aggrieved, they have offered the appellant what­
ever remedy she has sought. In most cases the 
desired remedy is a higher grade level with full 
backpay as allowed by Board rules. In fact, the 
Board’s remedy powers have been so broadly defined 
by the courts that a far wider range of options 
less damaging to the classification system are 
available. As examples, hearings examiners could 
order comparison positions to be reviewed and 
reclassified if necessary before a final order of 
the Board, they could provide backpay only while 
upholding the existing grade level, or they could 
require revision of key documents such as disputed
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class specifications or position descriptions 
prior to issuing an order.
While it is true that the district courts have ruled 
that the Board does have broad discretion by statute, on 
some occasions the board has exercised restraint by limiting 
the review to a narrow, procedural check to determine if the 
decision of the Personnel Division is consistent with law, 
rules, job evaluation methods and past practice. Given the 
numerous examples of restraint in its own case records, only 
an internal commitment on the part of the Board's staff 
would be needed to end the broad, substantive review that 
creates an alternative classification process.
2. The Board's Hearings Examiners Must Exercise Informed 
Review.
Even if the Board adopted exclusively the narrow scope 
of review described above, the need for expertise in job 
evaluation on the part of the hearings examiner would remain 
crucial. Given that the Board's hearings examiners exercise 
broad substantive review, the need for expertise is great. 
While this reform is perhaps less critical than the above 
reform, it represents a greater challenge to accomplish. 
The Classification Bureau's experience with training job 
analysts confirms that six months of intensive on-the-job 
experience is necessary before a new employee can consist­
ently and accurately apply the state's classification 
method. In 1981, the Bureau believed that publishing their
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methods and procedures manual and improving class specifica­
tions would greatly improve the hearings examiners ability 
to provide informed review. The experience since that time, 
however, does not confirm that belief. Hearings examiners 
since 1982 have continued to base decisions on vague notions 
of equity or to invent job evaluation schemes or variations 
to justify certain ends.
Additionally, the problem of an uninformed review has 
been compounded by other features of the grievance process. 
First, in almost every case, the citizen-members of the 
Board are less informed about job evaluation than the 
hearings examiners. Over time, the members of the Board
have appropriately tried to limit their review of hearing's 
examiners decisions to questions of clear error or legal
issues. But in so doing they have assumed that hearings
examiners are experts to whom they should defer. The record 
of past hearings examiner's decisions, however, does not 
support this conclusion. Finally, if a case is appealed 
to District Court, judges who are even further removed from 
the job evaluation process almost without exception have
deferred to the judgment of the Board on substantial issues 
- again assuming that the Board has the expertise along with 
the authority to judge correctly.
There is seemingly no simple solution to this problem. 
The Board could try to hire only examiners with actual 
Montana classification experience. This is not realistic.
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however, since the labor pool in that category is small and 
the workload of the Board's staff demands expertise in other 
matters such as Fair Labor Standards law, unemployment 
benefits determinations, and labor mediation and 
arbitration. Two opportunities for improvement in this area 
do, however, exist:
1. The Classification Bureau has left open its 
invitation to explain and train hearings examiners 
in a more indepth fashion than has been done in 
the past.
2. The new point factoring method developed by the 
Personnel Division has, as one of its most 
attractive features, the promise that it will be 
easier to use and to understand.
In the last analysis, given the difficulty of obtaining 
expertise, the earlier argument for more restrained review 
from hearings examiners is even more pertinent. Short of 
removing classification grievances from the Board, this 
seems the best way to provide an appeal process that pro­
tects employees' rights while complementing rather than 
undermining the state's classification method.
Chapter Summary
It is clear that to assure the continuance of an 
effective and equitable central job evaluation system, 
Montana needs a classification grievance mechanism. Given
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the nature of labor/management relations in Montana, it is 
also clear that the grievance mechanism used should be 
quasi-judicial or at least protective of the due process 
rights of state employees.
For several reasons, largely political, Montana chose 
to model its classification grievance method on the griev­
ance processes of collective bargaining contracts. Civil 
Service traditions and modern personnel board approaches 
were rejected, even though they seem better suited in most 
respects to deal with the subjective decision-making of job 
evaluation. As a result, even though classification is 
presently neither required nor permitted as a subject of 
collective bargaining, employees have access to an appeal 
process which has effectively treated classification griev­
ances as if they were part of a collective bargaining 
contract. The net result has been to the clear benefit of 
employees but at considerable expense to the classification 
system in particular, and Montana taxpayers in general.
Two historical criticisms of the Board's handling of 
classification grievances are still problems in 1987 that 
should be addressed by the Board. Raising the expertise of 
Board hearings examiners would greatly improve the quality 
of Board decisions by providing the knowledge necessary to 
protect employee rights without damaging the integrity of 
the classification system. At the same time, limiting the 
scope of review of hearings examiners is feasible under
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existing law and should be pursued. Hearings examiners 
would then rely on the expertise of trained job analysts 
rather than their own knowledge.
Until the appeal process is nothing more nor less than 
a guarantee that job evaluation is done correctly, rather 
than an alternative classification system with vague rules 
of circumstance and compromise, it will be an effective 
barrier to the Department of Administration in its mandate 
to assure similar pay for similar work for all state clas­
sified employees. Looking to the future, as suggested early 
in Chapter II, the state's mandate to work toward the goal 
of comparable worth will be difficult or impossible to meet 
if changes are not made. As long as an alternative classi­
fication system exists, the Department of Administration 
will be effectively prevented from successfully implementing 
the greater precision and explicitness of job evaluation 
methods advocated by the supporters of comparable worth.
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their budget can then be blamed on the appeal process - which they do not control.
4The issue of the effects of organizational and tech­
nological change upon occupations is a recurring challenge 
to job evaluation systems. Change seems to outpace even the 
best designed job evaluation methods and any input, such as 
a grievance, is welcomed by the keepers of the system as a 
means of discovering and adapting to change. In Montana, 
changes incurred by automated data processing have been most 
notable in demanding corresponding changes in classifica­tion .
^This statement is based on the assessments of key 
actors from management, labor and labor mediation. It is 
also confirmed by a review of testimony in committee on the 
two bills. In hearings on both bills no opponents offered 
testimony and both bills passed overwhelmingly in committee.
6See Footnote 31 in Chapter II in which the short period of mandatory bargaining is described as a key "re­
lease valve" which may have assured the survival of central 
classification in Montana.
^While there are few states nationally that combine the 
review functions for collective bargaining and classifica­
tion in one body, it is true that the neighboring states of 
Washington and Oregon use this approach.
8In terms of workload, it should be emphasized that the 
collective bargaining authority of the Board extends to some 
35,000 public employees in city, county and school district 
jobs in addition to state employees. Only 13,000 state 
employees are subject to the classification system that the 
Board reviews.
QMerrill J. Collett, "The Position Classification 
Method of Job Evaluation" in Harold Suskin, Job Evaluation 
and Pay Administration in the Public Sector, Chicago, 
Illinois, International Personnel Management Association,
1977, p. 119.
^^The Nebraska Department of Personnel, Classified 
System Personnel Rules and Regulations, 1986, p. 11.
^^Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law; Cases - Texts 
- Problems, St, Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Company,
1978, p. 514.
^^Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration 
Works, Washington, D.C., The Bureau of National Affairs, 
1973, p. 106.
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13John H. MeEwen and Eric Trimble "The Board of Person­
nel Appeals and the Classification Appeals Process," Staff 
Report No, 5 to the Personnel and Labor Relations Study Commission, Helena, Montana, 1981.
14An interesting evaluation of the Board of Personnel 
Appeals can be found in this consultant study. Montana's 
Board was reviewed as part of a multi-state project to 
compare labor practices sponsored by the Public Employment 
Relations Services and the Association of Labor Relation's 
Agencies. See Muriel Gibbons, James S. Cooper, Parker A. 
Denaco, Marvin L. Schurke, "Report and Recommendations to 
the Montana Board of Personnel Appeals," The Public Employ­
ment Relations Services Review and Evaluation Team, April, 
1981.
^"^Elkouri, p. 121.
15It is beyond the scope of this paper to cite cases 
supporting this conclusion. In recent years, a decision in 
a grievance known as the Fitzpatrick case has become the 
standard citation for asserting the Board's authority to 
exercise broad review and remedy powers. In that case, the 
Appellant argued that his work was unlike that of his peers 
in the same class. The Board then ordered the creation of a 
new class at a higher grade level just for the appellant's 
job. This decision was then upheld in District Court by a 
judge who deferred fully to the expertise of the Board and 
its hearings examiner.
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CHAPTER IV 
AN OUTLINE FOR REFORM
The call for reform, reorganization and change is 
relentlessly heard in the halls of modern bureaucracies. 
Whether the basis for reform is good or not, the prospects 
of it occurring depend, in no small measure, on how well the 
change fits within the parameters of existing circumstance. 
In the last chapter a diagnosis was made of the pervasive 
ills of Montana's classification grievance mechanism. In 
this chapter, the task is to prescribe plausible reforms to 
address those ills. Once the prescription has been made, 
the various implications of the changes will be assessed. 
Before the prescription, however, the parameters upon which 
it is based will be described.
The Parameters of Reform
The first and most significant of the parameters for 
the reforms proposed here is the present law regarding 
classification. The view taken here is that the law, which 
begins at MCA 2-18-201, is written broadly enough to accom­
modate the kind of reform that will be outlined. This is an 
essential point because recent history indicates that
81
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proposals to change the classification statute have little 
chance of success. Since the 1981 statutory changes prohib­
iting appeals of the grade assigned to a class, there have 
been a few, notably unsuccessful attempts by both labor and 
management interests to change the statute regarding appeals 
in the 1983 and 1985 legislative sessions.^
Problems of timing also suggest that reliance on a 
change of law to bring about reform is unrealistic. The 
Classification Bureau, in early 1987, has its new Benchmark 
Factoring Method ready for implementation. Since the 
Legislature will not meet again until 1989, reforms depend­
ent on a statutory modification would inhibit full imple­
mentation for at least two more years. Therefore, all the 
proposals that follow in this chapter are designed within 
the scope of the current classification statute.
A second parameter or assumption in this chapter is 
that the employees of this state and the state's classifi­
cation system must continue to have a grievance mechanism. 
Given the nature of labor-management relations in this 
state, it is further assumed that the grievance system 
should be quasi—judicial and protective of the due—process 
rights of the parties subject to the mechanism. It is true 
that a lengthy and valid argument could be made for elimi­
nating the appeal process entirely, but it is not an option
2considered in this chapter.
The next parameter for reform centers on the argument
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that most of this paper has sought to develop. Basically, 
the assumption is that the classification appeals process as 
it now operates is unnecessarily costly, increasingly 
legalistic to the detriment of the classification system, 
difficult for all parties to understand, and characterized 
by decisions that do not promote equity between classified 
positions. The reforms proposed here were conceived in 
response to such problems.
Finally, the reforms proposed in this chapter are 
intended to allow implementation of the proposed Benchmark 
Factoring Method (BFM). Therefore, before discussion of
the proposed rule changes, a brief outline of this new job
3evaluation approach is offered.
The BFM is a quantitative job evaluation method design­
ed closely along the lines of the federal government's
Factor Evaluation System (FES). It is like other point
4factoring systems in its basic construction. Under BFM, 
positions are evaluated by making a number of discrete 
decisions or ratings on different evaluative or compensable 
factors. The job analyst chooses between various degree 
levels of each factor and assigns one level for each factor 
to the position. An example of one of the simplest BFM
factors follows:
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FACTOR 2: PHYSICAL EFFORT
Level A — Little Physical Exertion
The work is normally sedentary involving such 
activities as sitting, talking, writing, periodic 
standing, periodic walking on smooth and level 
surfaces, driving a car and light manual 
manipulation from a seated position. It may also 
include occasional physical activities at level B 
or C . Examples include most desk jobs and many
other jobs primarily performed while seated.
Level B - Regular Light Physical Exertion or OccasionalHeavy Physical Exertion.
The work at this level normally or over 20% of the 
time involves standing while performing manual 
manipulations or greater or more constant activity 
than level A. Activities include regular walking 
on smooth, level surfaces, periodic but not
vigorous bending, turning, pushing, or pulling; 
periodic lifting of 10-25 lbs, or constant lifting 
of lighter weights. It may also include occasion­
al physical activities at level C. Examples
include dentistry, some lab work, filing, and
operating duplicating machinery.
or
The work normally involves light or sedentary
activities but occasionally involves heavy (level -
D) activity. Occasionally means at least an
average of 2 or 3 brief periods of level D activi­
ty per week or an equivalent degree of less 
frequent but more extended periods of level D
activity. Alternatively it can mean that the
ability to perform occasional level D activity is 
so critical irrespective of frequency that the
ability to meet a physical fitness standard is a 
condition of employment.
Level C - Regular Moderate Physical Exertion
The work at this level normally or over 20% of the 
time involves more vigorous and constant movement 
than level B. Activities may include regular 
bending, turning, pushing and pulling, regular 
walking on inclined or irregular surfaces, long 
periods of constant lifting of 10-25 lb. objects 
or frequent but not constant lifting of 25—50 lb. 
objects. It may also include occasional activity 
at level D. Examples include house painting, 
carpentry, sweeping or mopping floors, ironing 
clothes, planting, hoeing and raking, and institu-
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tional cooking.
Level D - Regular Heavy Physical Exertion
The work at this level normally or over 20% of the 
time involves vigorous and constant movement such 
as running; long periods of constant bending, 
turning, pushing or pulling, long periods of 
constant lifting of 25-50 lb. objects or periods 
of regular lifting of objects weighing 50 lbs. or 
more. Examples include stacking lumber, pick and 
shovel work, chopping wood, moving bed ridden 
patients, climbing up and down stairs or other 
steep inclines, and shoveling.
With reference to the above factor, if level ”C" was 
deemed characteristic of a particular job, a guidechart 
would provide the appropriate point value for level "C." 
That point value would be the third highest number of points 
possible under this Physical Effort factor. The point 
value, however, would be extremely low relative to other 
factors since each factor has been statistically weighted 
according to its relative importance to the total score for 
the position. The total point value of a position thus 
represents the sum of all scores on the seven BFM factors. 
The title and weight given the seven BFM factors are as 
follows :
1) complexity 2 5%
2) physical effort
3) knowledge and skills 40%
4) human relation skills 10%
5) work impact responsibility 20%
6) working condition hardships 2%
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7) working condition hazards 2%
TOTAL 10 0%
In terms of the implications of BFM for the appeals 
process, the key feature of the method is the use of bench­
mark jobs. Benchmark jobs are jobs that are typical of the 
positions in a particular class. Though they are derived 
from actual positions, they are hypothetical and not necess­
arily representative of any one position. A benchmark 
document contains a description of the benchmark job and a 
factor rating of the job on each of the seven factors. (See 
the sample benchmark in Appendix B). The benchmark jobs are 
used by an analyst as a guide for assigning factor levels to 
positions and as confirmation of equity in factor level 
assignments within a class. The comparison of factor 
ratings between classes and across occupations also provides 
evidence of equity and comparability throughout the larger 
system.
The equity role of the benchmark is similar to that of 
the class specification in the state's current methodology. 
Unlike the class specification, however, the benchmark is 
not the primary basis for allocation of a position to a 
class. Allocation to a class is determined by the accumu­
lated point value of a position derived from the seven 
factors. Because the benchmark is merely a guideline for 
assignment of factor levels and not the basis for assignment 
to a class, it must not be confused with, nor used as a
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substitute for, a class specification.
The relevant point to be made is that an hearings 
examiner, or even an employee or union representative, in 
reviewing a classification decision under BFM, will need to 
dramatically change the focus of their critique. More 
specifically, the kind of evidence and the weight given that 
evidence will be notably different in cases under the new 
method. Hearings examiners will need to learn the various 
rules of factor level assignment and adapt to the conven­
tions of point factor evaluation.
These adjustments can be made with only a few changes 
in the Board's rules. The rules, as currently written have 
proven adaptable to a number of method changes since 1975. 
For instance, the five compensable factors adapted by the 
Classification Bureau in 1980 are typically used as the 
basis for hearings examiner's decisions today, even though 
they are not specifically referenced anywhere in the Board's 
rules. Even more to the point, since a quantified system 
for executive and managerial jobs was introduced by the 
Classification Bureau in the early 1980s, several hearings 
have been held on positions subject to that method. In all 
cases, the hearings examiner recognized the difference in 
the method and applied it appropriately.^
Some rule modifications are needed, however, to make 
explicit the changes engendered by point factoring. Also, 
it is likely that some as yet unknown quirks in the new
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method will arise and will require adjustment in the griev­
ance process.^ Finally, having outlined the anticipated 
parameters of change, and particularly the implications of 
BFM, the discussion can now advance to the specific proposed 
rule changes.
Proposed Changes in the Board’s Rules
This section represents a proposal to modify the 
administrative Rules of Montana (A.R.M.) covering Wage and
Classification Appeals before the Board of Personnel
Appeals. The full existing rules beginning at A.R.M. 
24.26.501, last revised in 1984, are listed as Appendix C. 
The changes will be presented by citing the proposed rule 
changes in sequence with the numbered sections of the 
existing rules. When changes are not prescribed for a given 
section, that section has been omitted. Those portions of a 
section which represent language changes or additions have
been underlined. Each modified section is followed by a
detailed explanation of the rationale for the change.
Proposed Rule Change #1
At A.R.M. 24.26.508 Grievance Procedure at: (1) Step
One. Any employee, or group of employees or appropriately 
designated representatives properly certified by the Board 
pursuant to these rules at 24.26.513 may utilize this 
grievance procedure. The individual employee must obtain a 
State Employee Classification and Wage Appeal Form BPA-C(l) 
and follow the accompanying instructions. Procedures for 
initiating a group appeal are in these rules at 24.26.503.
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FoE'itis may be obtained from the Board of Personnel Appeals, 
Capitol Station, Helena, Montana, or from the personnel 
offices of all departments within the executive branch.
Discussion :
This is only a minor change intended primarily to 
reinforce proposed changes to 24.26.513, which is the 
section governing group appeals. Also, the Board's current 
rules incorrectly reference 24.26.404, which is a section 
pertaining to personnel grievances in the Department of 
Fish, Wildlife, and Parks. The proposed language corrects 
this error.
A good case could be made for removal of the phrase "or 
appropriately designated representatives" from this section 
as well. This language reflects that of the classification 
statute at MCA 2-18-203(2) , but elsewhere in the Board's
7rules and in its past practice it has been largely ignored. 
It is unlikely that a situation would occur in which a union 
would want to file an appeal regarding, as MCA 2-18-203(2) 
states, "the allocation or reallocation of a position to a 
class" without the cooperation of the individual in the 
position. Thus, the statutory language and the rule lang­
uage are superfluous. Since change in the statute would be 
needed and that has been ruled out earlier in this chapter, 
removal of the language will not be proposed here.
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Proposed Rule Change #2
Continuation of 24.26.508(1) at: (a) The appropriate
form when completed shall be submitted along with a current 
position description or position information questionnaire 
that has been signed by the employee and represents the 
employee’s understanding of the duties and responsibilities 
of his or her position.
Discussion :
The Personnel Division's experience indicates that many
grievances amount to a disagreement between the employee and
management over the assigned duties. The addition of this
requirement assures that the employee's version of the
assigned duties are clear and subject to rebuttal at all
steps in the process. Currently, in many grievances the
Personnel Division returns appeals at Step III to the
appellant to obtain a job description. Only with a current
job description completed by the appellant can an outside
party understand whether or how an appellant's understanding
8of their job differs from that of management. Since the 
state's current method utilizes a form called the position 
description, and the new BFM method uses a job description 
form called the position information questionnaire, both 
forms have been referenced.
The inclusion of this required job description would 
increase the chance of resolution at Step One or Two, since 
it would give management a better opportunity to recognize 
those cases where the duties of a position truly have 
changed and should be reclassified. Most importantly, this
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requirement promotes a narrowing of the entire grievance at 
^11 steps including the hearing, since the basis of the 
appeal would be more firmly established from the outset.
Proposed Rule Change #3
Continuation of 24.26.508(1) at; (b) To complete the 
form, the employee must identify one issue motivating the 
appeal. A list of appealable issues will be provided with 
the appeal form. If an issue or reason for the appeal is 
not adequately identified, the appeal may be returned to the 
employee at any step in the appeal procedure for clarifica­tion.
Discussion :
This proposal changes the section in one significant 
way. It would allow only one appealable issue. This change 
relates to the proposal below which would revise the allowed 
appealable issues. As such, the implications will be 
discussed in greater detail below.
Proposed Rule Change #4
Continuation of 24.26.508(1) at: (c) All grievances shall be
based on the application of the State * s job evaluation 
methods found in the Classification Manual, Volume III and 
shall be described in terms of one of the following issues:
(i) Substantial changes have occurred in my position 
to warrant reclassification. Specifically, my 
position should be allocated to the class titled 
(name and grade of class) or a new class titled 
(name and grade of proposed class).
(ii) My position was mi sal located to the (name of 
class) class and should be reallocated to the 
class: (name and grade of existing or proposed 
class) .(iii) My position was factored under a point factoring 
method of job evaluation. The Personnel Division 
erred in the assignment of factor levels under the 
factor(s) (list factor(s)). The correct factoring
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should be: (cite proposed factoring).
Discussion :
This proposed change is actually an attempt to bring 
the Board's rules closer to the statutory law that author­
izes the appeal process. The statute {MCA 2-18-203(2)) 
reads as follows:
Employees and employee organizations will be given the 
opportunity to appeal the allocation or reallocation of a 
position to a class. The grade assigned to a class is not 
an appealable subject under 2-18-1011 through 2-18-1013.
The statute clearly establishes that the only 
authorized subject for grievances is "to appeal the alloca­
tion or reallocation of a position to a class." Since the 
grade of a class is specifically eliminated by the statute 
as a subject of a grievance, the law clearly contemplates a 
far narrower range of appeal issues than the Board presently 
allows in its rules (see Appendix C) . The thirteen appeal- 
able issues presently in the Board's rules include issues 
that are (1) irrelevant to current and proposed classifica­
tion methodology; (2) issues of pay rather than classifica­
tion; (3) redundant and somewhat contradictory; and (4) 
illegal in that they suggest grievances that are outside the 
narrow range of "allocation or reallocation" specified by
9the statute.
The three proposed appealable issues cover all possible 
grievances legitimately based on issues of allocation or 
reallocation to a class. The adoption of these three
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issues offers four primary benefits:
1. When coupled with the proposed rule change #3 requiring
the appellant to choose just one of the three appeal
issues, these changes would provide increased focus to 
any investigation or hearing. Step III responses by 
the Personnel Division could be shortened. Hearings at 
Step IV could also be shorter and less costly. For the 
appellant, the rule change has the benefit of clearly 
communicating the burden of proof that is upon her. An 
appellant would be better able to focus the development 
of the case on the evidence that is relevant without 
being diverted by the extraneous and redundant issues 
often invoked under the Board's present rules.
2. More importantly, in a hearing at Step IV, an examiner
would be better able to readily place and maintain the 
burden of proof on the appellant. With only one issue 
in contention, irrelevant evidence or testimony could 
be more easily identified and eliminated. Hearings 
obviously could then be shorter and less costly. The 
nature of the hearing itself would also be changed to 
become a review of the Personnel Division's application 
of the method of allocating positions to classes, 
rather than an open-ended search for compromise and 
some version of "personal justice" for the appellant.
3. A third benefit of this proposed rule is that it 
explicitly establishes the Board's authority to create 
job classes as a remedy to a grievance. While never 
directly given to the Board in statute, this authority 
was established in a District Court action known as the 
Fitzpatrick case. In that case, the hearings examiner 
had ordered the Personnel Division to create a special 
job class at a higher grade to remedy Mr. Fitzpatrick's 
alleged grievance. After the full Board upheld this 
decision, the Personnel Division advanced its except­
ions to district court.
In the district court, the judge ruled for the Board 
and upheld the hearings examiner. He interpreted the 
statute covering the Board's remedy powers to be almost 
unlimited in the amount of discretion given an hearings 
examiner. The Personnel Division argued primarily that 
such an interpretation effectively negated the Classifi­
cation Act of 1973 since, by that Act, the legislature 
had given authority for developing and maintaining a 
central classification plan solely to the Department of 
Administration.
The Department essentially still believes that the
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Fitzpatrick decision legitimized the Board as a second­
ary classification authority in defiance of the clear 
intent of the legislature. In all likelihood, for that 
reason, the Personnel Division would oppose this
proposed rule change on the grounds that it defies the 
classification statute at MCA 2-18-201. Still, since 
the Fitzpatrick precedent guides the Board in the scope 
of its review and remedy powers, it is important that 
the extent of the Board’s willingness to intervene in 
the classification plan is made explicit in its rules.
In terms of the conduct of hearings, such explicitness
would offer the benefits cited in item two above. That
is, the proposal to create a new class would be known 
by both parties from the outset. Evidence for and 
against the new class could be presented and the
hearings examiner could then focus exclusively on that 
issue. This would immensely increase the protection of 
both parties' rights, since the creation of a new class 
could not be vaguely suggested by an appellant or, even 
worse, drawn out in a hearings examiner's decision like 
a rabbit from a top hat.
4. Adoption of the third proposed issue, addressing 
positions evaluated with point-factoring methods would, 
for the first time, bring formal recognition in the 
appeals process to point-factoring evaluation. This is 
vital for both the current job evaluation practices of 
the state and, most importantly, for the planned job 
evaluation improvements of the future.
Presently, the Classification Bureau evaluates all 
managerial and executive jobs under a point-factoring 
instrument called the Executive-Managerial Evaluation 
System (EMES). This method was formally adopted in 
1980 into the Classification Manual covering methods 
and procedures. Like all point—factoring systems, the 
EMES evaluates jobs by assigning degree levels or 
ratings on various criteria such as complexity of the 
work, size of the work impact and the number of staff 
supervised. Point values are recorded for each degree 
level and are compiled for all factors to produce an 
evaluative score. The total score is then equated to a 
pay grade through the use of a carefully designed 
conversion chart.
The Benchmark Factor Method (BFM) referenced earlier in 
this chapter operates approximately the same way as the 
EMES. Any review of decisions made using these methods 
should reflect the process by which decisions leading
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to the allocation or reallocation of a position to a 
class are made. The proposed third appealable issue is 
designed to do this and is modeled on the lines of the
grievance process used by the State of Michigan. In
Michigan all jobs are evaluated under point-factoring 
methods. As a result, that state's appeal mechanism 
focuses exclusively on the issue of ratings on the
various evaluative factors. Michigan's appeal forms 
are designed to capture specific information about disputed factor ratings.
The possibility of reducing disputes to a choice 
between two or possibly three factor level ratings 
promises to greatly rationalize the appeal process at 
all steps. In fact, since 1980, the Board has conduc­
ted a few hearings on positions covered by EMES. 
Hearings examiners, members of the Board, and repre­
sentatives of the appellants and of management have all 
observed that such hearings are more efficient and
easier to understand. Since the Personnel Division 
plans to implement BFM for all positions in the classi­
fication plan, eventually all hearings could be conduc­
ted under the proposed third issue.
To understand the final point that must be made about 
this particular rule change, some background explanation is 
necessary. The Board's rules originally contained no 
specified appealable issues. After five years of conducting 
grievance hearings without specified issues, both the 
Personnel Division and the largest union of state employees, 
the Montana Public Employees Association (MPEA), approached 
the Board to suggest a rule change. The Board's Adminis­
trator asked the two parties to propose a list of grievable 
issues for inclusion in the rules. The thirteen issues 
presently in the Board's rule were all proposed jointly by
the two parties.
A discussion with the Personnel Division's représenta—
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tive in this endeavor suggests that the basis for the 
thirteen issues was not the statute but rather the past 
practices in hearings until that time. In other words, any 
inconsistencies, redundancies, questions of legality or 
irrelevance in the thirteen issues merely reflects the 
presence of those same problems in hearings prior to 1980. 
It is more than a bit astonishing as a reflection of what 
these two actors expected from the process to note that 
their thirteenth allowable appeal issue was " (Other) must 
specifically relate to position classification". Clearly, 
the parties saw the process as almost totally unpredictable 
and wide-ranging. Their main objective in proposing the 
appealable issues was the hope that first, cases would at 
least be based on identified, explicit issues, and second, 
that the range of alleged grievances could be narrowed to no 
more than three or four in each case.
The genesis of the Board's thirteen appealable issues 
underscores the final point to be made about the proposed 
rule changes. Because the thirteen issues reflect actual 
practices rather than the statute, they are unnecessarily 
and prohibitively specific to the classification methods 
used in the first five years of the classification system. 
As such, the thirteen issues contradict and/or ignore the 
methodological implications of the proposed Benchmark 
Factoring Method. This is primarily true in the current 
issues (i) and (ii) where the reference is to grievances
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based on class specifications. Historically these are the 
appeal issues most used. In the BFM, class specifications 
are not used and the critical question is whether all the 
structured decisions leading to determination of a grade 
level are correct, rather than whether a class specification 
does or does not describe a position. Also, to the extent 
that BFM is seen as at least part of the attempt of the 
Personnel Division to obtain the mandated goal of comparable 
worth, then the Board's current appealable issues serve as a 
barrier to that statutory mandate.
Proposed Rule Change #5
Continuation of 24.26.508 at: (3) (b) The Personnel
Division shall have 3 0 working days to review the matter, 
record its findings in the appropriate section of the form 
and to issue its recommendation and return it to the 
employee or the proper representative.
Discussion :
The change here is simply to remove the phrase "issue 
its recommended adjustment" presently in the rules and to 
replace it with "issue its recommendation." This is necess­
ary because the Personnel Division regularly recommends no 
adjustments if its findings indicate that the position of an 
appellant is correctly classified.
Proposed Rule Change #6
Continuation of 24.26.508 at: (4)(c)(i) The Board shall
examine the issue(s) and exceptions identified by the 
employee. If the issue(s) and exceptions are adequately 
described, the Board will accept the appeal at Step Four and
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immediately serve notice of acceptance on the Personnel Division and the appellant.
Discussion :
This change is primarily an administrative courtesy. 
The Personnel Division often receives notice of acceptance 
of an appeal at Step Four weeks after the fact. This 
imposes a burden in planning and assigning work since the 
job analyst involved in the investigation of the appeal is 
obligated to spend many hours preparing for a hearing. It 
also causes a lengthening of the entire process since the 
Personnel Division and the appellant could begin the dis­
covery process much sooner if notified immediately. Final­
ly, this change, at least in a few cases, would allow the 
Personnel Division to monitor the Board's deadlines in rules 
(ii) and (iii) of this same section. Those rules are 
designed to force the appellants to explicitly describe 
their exceptions to the Personnel Division’s Step Three 
findings in a timely manner. If the appellant fails to do 
so, the entire process can be returned to Step One and the 
cost liability of the employing agency would be reduced in 
terms of a potential backpay obligation.
Proposed Rule Change #7
Continuation of 24.26.508(4) at: (d) If in the Board s
discretion it decides to conduct a preliminary investigation 
in the appeal, it shall have 20 days to do so. The Board 
may carry out any investigation deemed necessary for resolu­
tion of the appeal or complaint or the board may enter^into 
a stipulation with the two parties to the appeal to conduct
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a prescribed investigation under mutually agreed conditions. 
The employee or group of employees and Personnel Division 
shall have ten days to accept or reject the preliminary de­
cision unless all parties have previously stipulated accept­
ance of the preliminary decision. If the employee or group 
of employees and the Personnel Division accept the prelimi­
nary decision, it shall be final and binding. The Board 
shall then implement the preliminary decision by instructing 
the Personnel Division to remedy the situation.
Discussion :
This rule change suggests implementation of a request 
made jointly by MPEA and the Personnel Division in early 
1979. At the time the two parties were faced with a tremen­
dous backlog of appeals and long delays before hearings were 
conducted. In a memo on the proposal, the two protagonists' 
suggestion was summarized as follows:
Basically, the proposal recommends re-establishing the 
preliminary investigation with the following additions:
A) Appeals to be investigated would be identified with 
sufficient lead time so that both parties could prepare 
cases.
B) Both parties would exchange case materials two weeks 
prior to a pre-investigation conference.
C) A pre—investigation conference would be held at which 
both parties would present their case.
D) The investigator would have a set time frame to com­
plete their investigation, reach a decision and prepare 
an investigative report.
E) Only exceptions to the investigative report could be 
continued to a hearing and hearings would be limited to 
those specific exceptions.
The current administrative hearing process has proven 
to be inefficient, time consuming and not a very good means 
for making classification decisions. We feel, and MPEA 
agrees, that a procedure as outlined above would be much 
more effective.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
The rule change here goes one step further by offering 
two additional provisions: 1) that the parties could
stipulate the scope of the investigation; and 2) that the 
parties could stipulate acceptance of the investigators 
decision and waive the right to a hearing or to later court 
action.
The first provision simply adds protection of rights to 
the notion of a preliminary investigation by assuring that 
each party would, through stipulation, be assured that the 
hearings examiner would consider certain specified documents 
and/or interview certain key persons. One reason why 
preliminary investigations have been rarely used in recent 
years is that the parties are concerned that the hearings 
examiner may overlook or ignore key elements of their case. 
This provision could raise the level of trust in the prelim­
inary investigation and restore it as an option for resolu­
tion of grievances-
The second provision adds the possibility of binding 
authority to a preliminary decision. This would increase 
the Board’s interest in conducting such investigations 
since, as an alternative to a hearing, a preliminary de­
cision would no longer represent a lengthening but a reduct­
ion of the process. For the parties to the appeal, the main 
benefit of this provision would be to shorten the process 
and to increase the informality of the process while reduc­
ing or eliminating the possibility of losing a case on a
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procedural issue or legal error. As an example/ parties 
could present evidence in terms that are meaningful in 
everyday experience without concern for the finer, legal 
points of proper foundation or hearsay. The hearings 
examiner who is trained to protect due process could then 
assess the adequacy or inadequacy of evidence and testimony 
on his own.
The use of a stipulation process also enhances the 
flexibility of the process administratively. For instance, 
arrangements could be made to allow witnesses to cross 
examine each other. Also, a time and place convenient to 
just those persons involved in one aspect of the case could 
be chosen. Other witnesses could be interviewed by phone or 
at the convenience of the hearings examiner. Since travel 
cost is of concern to the Board, the preliminary investiga­
tion in lieu of a hearing is especially attractive. The 
essential point is that all three parties to an appeal, 
would, by stipulation, be able to define the conditions 
under which a binding decision might be made. Finally, the 
use of the preliminary decision as an alternative to a 
hearing would be subject to veto by any one of the three 
parties. The Board would, of course, retain its discretion­
ary authority in section (e) of this same rule to refuse to 
conduct a preliminary investigation of any sort.
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Proposed Rule Change #8
Continuation of 24.26,508 at: (g) If the preponderance
of evidence taken at the hearing shows the employee is
aggrieved, the Board shall issue an order requiring action
to resolve the employee's grievance,
(F) The Board's order of an upgrade can be implemented inone of two ways :
(i) the appellant's position may be reclassified with 
backpay from 30-days prior to initiation of Step One ; or
(ii) the appellant's position may be modified by
assignment of duties appropriate to the classes 
recommended at Step Three by the Personnel Divi­
sion. The Personnel Division, when using this
option, shall provide an appropriate job descrip­
tion to the Board documenting the changes in the 
position and shall provide the higher pay ordered 
by the Board to the appellant for a period of not 
less than 30-days prior to the initiation of the 
appeal until 180 days following the date of the 
Board's final order. The appellant may file a 
new grievance at Step One 180 days after the first 
hearing order if the appellant believes his/her 
position has not been significantly changed to
warrant the lower grade level. A second hearing
may be conducted on this issue, and if the Board
finds the appellant's job unchanged, the Board may
order an upgrade under the provision of 24.26.508 
F(i) .
Discussion :
This change is aimed at one particular and common kind 
of grievance. Appellants often feel that they have, for any 
number of reasons, assumed duties not originally in their
job description. Typically, this has either not been the
intent of the supervisor, or the supervisor, in assigning
the duties, does not realize that they constituted a higher
level responsibility. In such cases, unions and employees 
have traditionally argued that the intention of the supervi­
sor does not change the principle that employees should be
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paid for the work they actually perform. Hearings examiners 
normally have agreed and have ordered permanent upgrades for 
such appellants.
The permanent upgrade creates obvious problems, how­
ever. First, agencies have not budgeted for the reclassifi­
cation. Second, the circumstances causing the change in 
duties is often temporary. The loss of another worker in 
the office can, for instance, impact an appellant’s job 
until the co-worker is replaced. Also, if the duties have 
been self-assigned by the appellant without the knowledge of 
management, managers lose the opportunity to assign, or 
otherwise dispose of the duties in another manner. In
effect, the Board, by permanently upgrading an appellant,
12intervenes in a manager’s right to manage as she sees fit.
The final part of this rule change establishes a means 
for an employee to grieve again if they feel that the 
changes in the position have not occurred. In other words, 
employees would be protected from retaliation on the part of 
management not only by the job description submitted to the 
Board to document the change, but by the opportunity for a 
second hearing on the matter.
Finally, the provision for 180 days of pay protection 
at the higher rate acknowledges that employees should be 
paid for what they do. The 18 0-day period is in fact the 
amount of pay protection currently given to employees whose 
positions are downgraded because of a change in duties under
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Proposed Rule Change #9
At A.R.M. 24.26.513: (4) In a case designated as a
group appeal by the Board and consisting entirely of posi­
tions from one agency, the appeal shall begin at Step Two of 
the formal appeals procedure provided in 24.26.508 and shall 
be based on one of the three appealable issues listed in 24.26.508(c>.
(5) In a case designated as a group appeal by the Board and 
consisting of positions from more than one agency ̂ the 
appeal shall begin at Step Three of the formal appeals 
procedure provided in 24.26.508.
Discussion :
This proposed rule change is aimed at bringing agencies 
into the process governing group appeals. Presently, the 
Board's rules specify that all group appeals should begin at 
Step Three in the process. This provision was appropriate 
in the first years of the classification system because 
unions organized employees from various agencies into 
groups. Since no one agency could respond to such a group 
at Step Two, the grievance was begun at Step Three. With 
the 1981 statute change outlawing appeals of the grade 
assigned to a class, the number and kind of group appeal has 
changed (see Chapter Three, page 68). Therefore, the change 
here would require a response from the agency at Step Two, 
when all the members of the group work for one agency. The 
advantage would be that such appeals could potentially be 
solved by the agency and that, if the grievance was advanced 
to Step Three or Four, the later participants would be able
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to evaluate the agency's assessment of the grievance. Under 
the current rules, agencies are often confused and sometimes 
resentful that group appeals can be advanced and resolved 
without any input from the agency which must then accommo­
date the budgetary and managerial results of the final de­
cision.
Implications of the Proposed Rule Changes
In terms of the stated objectives of the reforms 
advocated in this paper, even the implementation of every 
proposed rule discussed above would not fully address the 
diagnosed problems of the grievance process. In most areas, 
large amounts of discretion would still reside with the 
hearings examiner and the members of the Board. The only 
proposal significantly reducing the Board's discretion is 
Proposed Rule Change #8. This change would prevent the 
Board from permanently resolving what, in many cases, is or 
could be only a temporary classification problem. With that 
one main exception, extensive discretion would remain with 
the Board, and this suggests that a willingness on the part 
of the Board to redefine its role may be at least as import­
ant as any rule change.
The new role of the Board prescribed here would be
primarily characterized by:
1. A willingness to restrain the scope of review in 
hearings.
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This posture would be established by firmly holding the 
burden of proof on appellants while focusing on the 
narrowest, most specific appealable issue(s). The 
weight of testimony offered by job analysts would 
normally be greater than that of testimony of appell­
ants - at least when the focus is on application of the 
job evaluation method. Finally, when evaluating the 
relevance and weight of evidence, emphasis would be 
placed on that evidence relating directly to whether 
the Personnel Division's Step Three response is correct 
or incorrect rather than whether the appellant "deserv­
es a raise" or appears to have been treated unfairly by management.
2. A willingness to learn and master the unique intrica­
cies of job evaluation in general and the many provis­
ions of Montana's method in particular.
As portrayed earlier in this paper, the challenge of 
understanding job evaluation is ongoing and to some 
extent, overwhelming. But if the Board intends to 
exercise a kind of secondary classification authority, 
that challenge must be met at least by the Board's 
staff, if not by the citizen members of the Board. 
Training in the field should be arranged. Specializa­
tion in classification matters by one or two hearings 
examiners is a plausible option that the Board once 
tried with success and perhaps should be used again. 
The advantages suggested by Proposed Rule Change #4, 
which reduces the number of appealable issues, can only 
be realized if hearings examiners are not only willing 
but able to review the decisions of the Classification 
Bureau and make informed orders thgiÿ make sense in 
terms of equity in the larger system.
3. A willingness to accommodate change in the provisions 
and organizational climate of the job evaluation 
system.
Job evaluation was treated with great suspicion by some 
legislators, employees and unions when it was adopted 
in 1973. Numerous safeguards were put in place by law, 
rule and practice to protect the worker's obvious 
interests. As central job -evaluation has gained 
effectiveness and credibility in the past eleven 
years, some of these safeguards have been eased or at 
least circumscribed by changes in the structure of the 
grievance process. To its credit, the Board has proven 
both willing and adept at adopting the necessary 
changes that have allowed the classification system to 
mature. In a sense the present job hierarchy is a
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product of a period of give and take between management 
and labor, overseen by the Board and directly reflect­
ive of the Board's role as an arbitrator of the system.
Today, as the Personnel and Labor Relations Study
Commission concluded, the classification system in Montana,
having survived its infancy, is ready to walk ahead with
much less oversight from the Board. The planned methodology
changes and the state's comparable worth law will create the
need for changes in the appeal process. While many of those
changes have been spelled out here, many others as yet
unseen, will arise. If the appeal process is to complement
rather than impede these changes, the Board must assume a
new role in the process.




^In the 1983 session. House Bill 309 which was designed 
and endorsed by the Personnel and Labor Relations Study 
Commission, attempted to create a uniform grievance process 
covering the protection of general employee rights and 
classification grievances. The key feature of the bill, 
originally was that it also specified that the Classifica­
tion Bureau's decision would be upheld unless the appellant 
proved with "clear and convincing" evidence that the Bureau 
had erred. This "clear and convincing" standard is legally 
a higher burden than the present requirement of a preponder­ance of evidence.
House Bill 309 passed the House but was killed in the 
Senate on a close committee vote. An attempt was made to 
amend the bill in the Senate to create a new Board attached 
to the Department of Administration to hear all grievances. 
The amended version, however, also failed to pass the 
Senate.
In the following 1985 session of the legislature, as if 
in retaliation for management's initiatives in 1981 and 
1983, unions backed two bills to dramatically enhance the 
employees' prospects in a grievance. House Bills 806 and 
485 called for statutory change to make most classification 
activities the mandatory subject of bargaining and/or 
approval by the unions. This proposal would have revised 
the 1977 legislature which defind classification as merely a 
permissive bargaining subject. House Bill 485 was aimed 
specifically at providing a veto power to unions over the 
adoption of new or revised class specifications. Since 
these specifications determine the class allocation of 
positions, the proposal clearly would have shifted basic 
classification authority away from the State Personnel 
Division and the Board in favor of the union. Both Bills 
failed in committee and did not pass in the House.
^Over time the Montana Department of Institutions has 
evolved into perhaps the most persistent opponent to the 
existence of the grievance process. Their opposition is 
partly philosophical but mainly practical. Given their 
highly unionized workforce and the conditions under which 
their employees work, the Department of Institutions has 
dealt with a greater number of appeals and has lost more 
appeals than other state agencies. Conversely, unions 
would, of course, vehemently resist the removal of the 
grievance process for obvious philosophical or political
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reasons and for less obvious practical reasons. In practi­
cal terms, representation in the appeal process is a major 
selling point to increase and maintain union memberships. 
Interest in union membership can be and has been generated 
by the mostly accurate suggestion to employees that with 
skilled representation, an upgrade can be obtained for aImo s t anyone.
3Montana State Personnel Division, Comparable Worth in 
Montana State Government; Report to the Fiftieth Legisla­
ture, Department of Administration, Helena, Montana, 1986,
p . 20 .
^For a detailed discussion of the genesis and mechanics 
of BFM see, Tewolde Habtemicael, "Equal Pay For Work of 
Comparable Worth and the Case of Montana State Government," 
University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, 1985, pp. 59-73.
5See the case files of the following grievances based 






^One example of this kind of problem would be a situa­
tion where the incumbent of a position evaluated by BFM 
appealed on the basis of error in one factor level assign­
ment. In some cases, if the dispute centers on a factor 
given little weight, even if the appellant were given the 
highest level on that particular factor, it would not change 
the point total for the job substantially enough to cause an 
upgrade. This creates the prospect of hearings over dis­
agreements that do not effect grade level. As such, the 
hearing would be an exercise in futility if not gross 
inefficiency.
^The inclusion of unions as a party with standing in an 
employee grievance procedure is but another reflection of 
the historical roots of the process as described in Chapter 
III. It clearly represents the attempt in 1973 and 1975 to 
make classification more palatable to union interests. In 
many ways it parallels unfair labor practice (ULP) charges 
in the collective bargaining domain since, presumably, it 
would allow unions to file general classification and wage 
grievances to protest the lack of good faith of managemen 
in carrying out the classification plan.According to the Administrator of the Employment 
Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Industry, 
only once has a union used this statutory opportuni y o
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fil© s grisvanc©. That occuirred in the late 1970* s when the 
MPEA filed a grievance to dispute changes in the state's Pay 
Plan Rules. No hearing was conducted however, as the union 
eventually vented its concerns to the State Personnel Division.
gTo illustrate the kind of dispute arising from a job duty, consider this example.
On the employee's job description;
Employee counsels job applicants on career development 
opportunity, advises applicants in training options and 
negotiates the details of a training plan.
On the Supervisor's job description for the same employee ;
Employee completes job training forms by explaining 
services available to the client and scheduling the 
client for those training opportunities for which he 
has previously established eligibility.
Obviously, the employee either sincerely or dubiously 
has a much higher opinion of this task than the supervisor. 
At Step Three or in a hearing at Step Four the job analyst 
or hearings examiner often must essentially reconcile the 
difference to make a decision.
9To illustrate the problems with the present thirteen 
appealable issues, a brief commentary on each rule is in 
order :(i) The class specification doesn't adequately de­
scribe my position duties.
This is a valid issue but it is far too vague as a 
basis for a full case. Appellants rarely, if ever, rely on 
just this issue.(ii) A different class specification is a better 
description of my position duties.
This is really a companion to issue (i) and is somewhat
vague apart from (i).(iii)The class title is inappropriate for my position. 
This is totally irrelevant. Agencies can use whatever
working title they choose for a job. Grade levels and pay 
are not established by job titles but by the level of work 
assigned.(iv) The minimum qualifications are not equivalent to 
those required to do my job.The minimum qualifications of a job are not used as a 
measurement criteria in Montana's current system. Most 
hearings examiners realize this and ignore appellants
arguments on this issue.(v) Other positions assigned to the same class have
less difficult work than my position.
This issue may be relevant when combined with (i) or
(ii) but apart from them it usually is meaningless. The
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classification msthod states that jobs are assigned to 
classes with preset grades rather than assigning grades to 
positions. Thus y comparisons to other positions only tell part of the story,
(vi) My position duties are more similar to positions assigned to a different class.
This issue is largely redundant and suffers from the same limitations described for (v).
(vii)Other positions assigned to the same class perform 
duties significantly different than my position duties.
The issue is completely redundant with issue (v) and therefore is not needed.
(viii) The Position Description for my position class 
does not adequately describe the duties and responsibilities assigned.
This issue is puzzling since employees normally com­
plete their own job descriptions. At any rate, problems 
over job descriptions should be addressed before the griev­ance begins.
(ix) There are significant responsibilities assigned to 
my position which are not included in the Position 
Description.
This issue is redundant with issue (viii) above.
(x) There are significant duties described in the 
Position Description which are not performed by 
this position.
This issue is also redundant with (viii) above.
(xi) There is not a current Position Description 
available for my position.
This issue lacks relevance as indicated in the critique 
of issue (viii) above.(xii) The Pay Plan Rules have been incorrectly applied 
to my position (specific rule(s) should be cited).
Pay Plan rules are not cited as the basis for a griev­
ance in the establishing statute (see MCA 2-18-203(2)). 
They are thus of questionable legality and should not be 
included here.(xiii) (other) must specifically relate to position 
classification.This issue is so open-ended as to be preposterous. It 
is rarely used and suggests a degree of leeway not supported 
by the rest of the Board's rules,
^^It should be noted that if this rule was adopted, the 
Board would be well-advised to change the name of the 
process from Classification and Wage Appeals to Classifica­
tion Appeals. Clearly the statute in addressing only 
allocation and reallocation as the basis for appeals, does 
not imply that wage setting or application of the pay ru es
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is to be included. Presently the Board's twelfth appealable 
issue specifically allows appeals based on the application 
of the pay plan rules. While there is language in statute 
(M.C.A. 2—18—1011) suggesting the Board's authority to hear 
pay grievances, if the Board intends to do so, separate
rules should be developed for pay grievances.
The letter cited here is an internal document of the 
Personnel Division. The letter was written by the Classi­
fication Bureau Chief at the time, Mark Cress, and was sent
to Mr. Cress's superior, William Gosnell. See Memo from
Mark Cress to William Gosnell, State Personnel Division, March 15, 1979, p. 2.
12Agencies have been effectively handcuffed by past
Board decisions. Appellants' jobs are often viewed as 
untouchable for fear of retaliation charges. As a result, 
agencies report that they manipulate and sometimes duplicate 
work assignments to avoid the "problem" position.
13Rule 1813, Pay Plan Rules, 1985, Montana Operations 
Manual, Policy 3-0505.
14For a more indepth explanation of this argument, see 
Chapter III, pages 66-68.
^^This claim is of course a relative one. Compared to 
the first few years of the system, there are presently fewer 
classification appeals. This suggests acquiescence if not 
acceptance on the part of employees. Managers tend to 
support the concept of job evaluation, though they readily 
admit their ignorance of its details. Though unions today 
decry the credibility of the state's current methods when 
arguing for an appellant, it must be recalled that the MPEA 
was the most vocal supporter of continuing the present 
system during public hearings in 1983. For a more detailed 
assessment of overall effectiveness of Montana's system see 
- John H. MeEwen, "Position Classification in Montana State 
Government: A Critical Review." A professional paper for
the degree of Masters of Public Administration, Montana 
State University, 1982, pp. 27-45.
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CHAPTER V 
THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
With the problems diagnosed and some remedies prescrib­
ed, this chapter examines the prospects for change in the 
grievance mechanism. After briefly describing the momentum 
for the status quo, various reasons to believe that change 
is indeed possible will be discussed. Next, the discussion 
will turn to a proposed plan of action to bring about the 
changes endorsed in this paper. Finally, the chapter closes 
with a broad perspective on change itself.
The Time is Right for Reform of Montana's Grievance Process 
Most of the problems described in earlier chapters are 
not revelations original to this paper. Criticisms and 
reform proposals aimed at improvement literally began with 
the appeal process itself. This, of course, tends to 
support the classic status quo argument: The situation can't 
be all that bad if its lasted this long. Time and past 
practice are the main line of defense against change. As 
alluded to earlier, unions, having achieved great success 
through the appeal process since 1975, obviously still have 
an interest in seeing appeals conducted like "business as
113
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usual."
The MPEA, having been by far the most active union in 
classification appeal actions, will appropriately carry a 
powerful voice in determining whether change occurs and, 
ultimately, whether it can succeed. The MPEA represents 
more than half of all unionized, classified employees. With 
the limitations imposed statutorily on them in bargaining 
for wages, the MPEA has always contended that even if the 
appeal process favors the union, it is a small price to pay 
for labor peace in state government.
In the end, that argument, despite its failure to 
address the many negative consequences of appeals on the 
classification system, may well continue to prevail. There 
are, however, a number of considerations that suggest the 
time is now right for the kinds of changes prescribed in 
this paper. Some of these considerations are subtle and 
subject to more than one interpretation. Taken together, 
however, they form the basis for the contention here - that 
change is clearly possible, if not inevitable.
First, in 1987, both Montana and the nation are experi­
encing an era of fiscal and political conservatism. The
political dimension of conservatism has placed unions on the
1defensive and, some have argued, on the decline. Conserv­
ative politicians are not inclined to look after union 
interests. In Montana state government, total union member­
ship has not changed notably in recent years; however, em­
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ployee unrest with declining pay levels and discouraging 
words from legislators has been manifested in disgruntled 
bargaining units leaving one union to join another. In this 
trend, the MPEA has seen some decline in its state employee 
membership and probably some decline in its influence on 
state policies.
Fiscal conservatism creates an interest in almost any 
proposal that might save money. Salaries are the single 
largest cost in Montana's general fund budget. In its 
report to the 1982 study commission, the State Personnel 
Division reported that appeals authorized by the Board from 
1975 to 1979 cost $2.6 million. ̂ This of course is only the 
direct, initial cost of these appeals. Once the salaries of 
a class are raised, they become a permanent increased cost 
to future budgets. Also, the phenomena of "grade creep" is 
accelerated as a position upgraded through an appeal is used 
in comparison to justify the upgrade of other positions. 
While it is difficult to assign a firm price tag to Board 
decisions, it clearly is in the millions of dollars. The 
potential for significant savings based on the assumption 
that restricted review of classification decisions by the 
Board would reduce the number of upgrades ordered is certain 
to attract budget cutters and those who cater to them.
Another important consideration is the movement for 
comparable worth. As of the writing of this paper, it 
appears that an attempt to repeal the state's comparable
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worth law has been turned back. ̂  There are at least two 
implications of this reiteration of commitment to comparable 
worth :
1. Montana's unions cannot afford to be seen as the 
only obstacles to changing the grievance mechanism to allow 
full implementation of BFM. Unions, nationally and in 
Montana, have been vocal proponents of comparable worth and 
seemingly they will have to accommodate changes to put it in place in Montana,
2. For perhaps the first time since its inception, 
job evaluation now has a visible and vocal advocate group in 
the form of the women's movement. Though in Montana that 
movement has not yet achieved a sophisticated understanding 
of the state's classification system, it is reasonable to 
believe that they will eventually. Potentially then, to the 
extent that women's interest groups identify an improved 
classification system as one of their goals, they may be a 
force for changes in an appeal process that threatens the 
equity of that system.
The next consideration is that the current appointed 
members of the Board of Personnel Appeals appear to be 
anxious for the adoption of BFM. This interest is based on 
the Board's deliberations in a 1985 case on appeal to the 
Board.^ The hearings examiner in this case, in ruling 
against the State Personnel Division, had created a point- 
factoring method in her findings of fact. This "method' 
consisted of a point scale conversion of each of the quali­
tative factors now used by the Classification Bureau. The 
State Personnel Division argued that regardless of whether 
the hearings examiner had reached the right decision, she 
had clearly abused her discretion by inventing her own
classification method.
The Board ultimately concurred with the State Personnel
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Division in this case, but its discussions about point— 
fâctoiring were most revealing. Essentially, the Board 
members asserted that reviewing cases that had been point- 
factored was immeasurably easier and more fair than de­
cisions made under the state's current method. Members of 
the Board questioned the State Personnel Division's counsel 
at some length about the status of BFM and their hope that 
it would be adopted soon. Thus, there is every reason to 
believe that members of the Board will welcome the improve­
ments of BFM and strive to advance the appeals process into 
a new classification era in Montana.
A Plan of Action
Since it has traditionally been the perspective of the 
State Personnel Division that the classification grievance 
mechanism is in need of repair, the State Personnel Division 
should take the first steps in that direction. It is 
recommended here that the State Personnel Division initiate 
the process of change by formally proposing the rule changes 
in Chapter IV to the Board. This proposal should be made as 
soon as the Division has established a timeline for imple-
5mentation of BFM,
The Division should in its formal request urge the 
Board to establish an informal committee pursuant to the 
Montana Administrative Procedures Act at MCA 2-4-304 to 
provide advice to the Board on reshaping its rules. The
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purpose of the committee would be to provide an informal 
forum for all interested parties to discuss reform of the 
Board's rules and its role in classification hearings. The 
makeup of the committee might include the chair of the 
appointed members of the Board ̂ one staff member of the 
Board, an attorney for the Board, one representative from
each of the state's largest public employee unions - the 
MPEA and the Montana Federation of Teachers - and an
attorney and representative of the State Personnel Division 
appointed by the Director of the Department of Adminis­
tration .
The importance of the committee is that, as suggested 
in Chapter IV, a change in the Board's rules will not 
suffice to address the historic problems of the process as 
discussed in Chapter III. A new role for the Board must be 
defined in a way that the parties to the process can under­
stand, if not fully accept. The committee process offers an 
avenue on which the dialogue regarding the Board’s role can 
take place. The committee would, of course, be only ad­
visory as described in the law and the Board would unilat­
erally decide whether and how to design changes in its 
rules.
Along these same lines, it is recommended that the 
State Personnel Division make arrangements with the inter­
ested unions to provide regular input to the BFM implementa­
tion process. This could take the form of a permanent
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standing committee charged with review and comment on all 
benchmark jobs as they are adopted for use. This committee 
could include union appointed employees or union officials 
along with representatives of agency management and the 
Classification Bureau. Another alternative would be to use 
the existing Job Classification Advisory Council, which was 
created to develop the classification improvements called 
for by the 1982 study commission. The important point is 
that unions should be given a greater role in establishing 
job evaluation criteria while being asked to cooperate in 
formulating a lesser role for the Board of Personnel 
Appeals.
If this approach brings an insufficient response, the 
State Personnel Division should escalate its case for change 
by preparing statutory reforms for the 1989 legislature. 
Such reforms could include:
1. Restoring its nearly successful 1983 call for the 
creation of a new board attached to the Department of 
Administration to hear all personnel and classification 
grievances ;
2. Asking the legislature to add language to raise 
the burden of proof upon the appellant from a mere "prepon­
derance of the evidence" to the more demanding burden of 
"clear and convincing evidence,"^ and/or
3. Asking the legislature to require that all 
remedies be ordered directly by the Board and that hearings
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
examiners can only recommend findings of fact to the full 
board.^
All these proposals for statutory change, and others 
not mentioned, could be pursued individually or in combina­
tion. Finally, while it is preferable to press for change 
below the statutory level, the grievance problems are grave 
enough that the State Personnel Division should have an 
alternative plan of action, if the rule-change strategy 
fails.
Closing
The English Philosopher, Francis Bacon, once wrote: "As
the births of living creatures are at first illshapen, so
8are all innovations which are the births of time." This 
paper is hardly the last word on the subject of grievance 
reform in Montana. It would be folly, indeed, to believe 
that change will occur on the basis of this one perspective. 
Rather, it is hoped that this paper, in putting forth a 
clearly labeled perspective - that of the daily practitioner 
of the job evaluation art - will provide a starting point 
from which management, employees, unions, and the Board can 
learn and to which they can react. The truest test of the 
value of this effort is not whether its vision of change 
prevails, but whether change occurs at all.




For a recent summary of the perceived general decline 
of unions in the Montana political arena seei Charles S 
Johnson^ " L a b o r I n f l u e n c e  in Helena Wanes," The Great 
^98^^  ̂ Great Falls, Montana, Monday, February 9,
2John H. McEwen and Eric Trimble, "The Board of
Personnel Appeals and the Classification Appeals Process," 
Staff Report No. 5 to the Personnel and Labor RelationsStudy Commission, Helena, Montana, 1981, p. 18-19.
3The reference here is to Senate Bill 169 introduced in
the 19 87 Legislature. That bill proposed repeal of the
Comparable Worth Statute. It received a tie vote in a
Senate committee and as of this writing is given little 
chance of passing during this session. It is worth noting 
that public unions opposed the bill and thus, supported the 
state's continued commitment to comparable worth.
4For a record of these deliberations, see the minutes, 
or request the taped transcript of the meeting of the Board 
of Personnel Appeals of October 11, 1985.
^As of this writing, the State Personnel Division
anticipates beginning implementation of BFM in the Spring or 
Summer of 1987.
^Clear and Convincing proof is defined as: "That
measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of 
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to allegations 
sought to be established; it is intermediate, being more 
than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty 
as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. 
Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc., v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 211 
S.E.2d 88, 92." Henry Black, Black's Law Dictionary,
St. Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Company, 1979, p. 227.
^The idea here would be that both parties to an appeal 
would have an opportunity to propose a remedy to a grievance 
to the full Board. This could result in improving the 
Board's ability to adapt a remedy that made sense in terms
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of position equity within the classification system-
QH , L , Mencken, A New Dictionary of Quotations: On
Historical Principles From Ancient and Modern Sourcesr New 
York, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1942, p. 593.
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BenchmarklOT (E -2 ) Geolot^st
FCTR3\iCC-JB-RW
DUTIES
Performs professional, advanced geological and geotechnical engineering work to 
provide design recommendations used in highway design, construction and mainte­
nance pro jects . Th is  position is supervised by the supervisor of the Geology Sec­
tion.
A. S u pervisory /M anageria l Duties:
Time
Provides leadw orker supervision on a project basis by performing the 
follow ing duties;
5% 1. Planning
a. Partic ipates in  deliberations on the general nature and content of 
project operations, and independently plans and carries out 
specific project operations
includ ing  methods, work procedures and work flow.
b . Participates in  preparation of workload cost and other estimates 
needed fo r the preparation and defense of budget requests.
2. Supervision
a. Assigns and directs the work of subordinates and co-workers.
b . Determ ines technical adequacy of project work.
c . Provides tra in in g  to subordinates.
d . Participates in  decisions to reprimand subordinates.
e. Coordinates project activities with other agency units and
ind iv iduals  outside the agency as needed.
B. N on-supervisory  D u tie s :
Time
35^ 1. Geotechnical Field Work -
âü Records and in te rp re ts  physical features of the earth (surface
and su b -su rface ) to id en tify  conditions that would affect engi­
neering  projects; using measuring instruments, geological knowl­
edge and geotechnical knowledge.
b . Investigates landslides to determine causes of slides in order to 
submit correc tive  and economic recommendations; using
geotechnical knowledge and analytical skills.
c. Insta lls  and monitors instrum ents to measure rock and soil
param eters such as soil movement, soil strength and seismic
properties ; using knowledge of instrument operation and proper 
instrum ent placement.
d . Advises engineers on ongoing construction projects to assure 
geological accuracy of projects; using geologic plans and reports  
and knowledge of highway construction procedures.
15% 2. Laboratory Work . . .  , , .T. O rganizes l in d  coordinates the testing of soil and rock to deter­
mine th e ir  properties for use in geotechnical solutions using
1 -
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various testing  equipment and specialized knowledge of lab 
procedures.
b . In te rp re ts  and evaluates laboratory and visual testing to develop
recommendations for highway design.
30% 3 . Report Preparation
a . Composes w ritten  analysis of data and test results to produce 
complete design rep o rt, using knowledge of proper geological 
report formats.
b . Formulates and writes specifications concerning geotechnical
situations for use in  construction contracts.
10% 4. Review and Approval
a l Reviews prelim inary and final construction designs and provides
comments and corrections to insure geologic soundness of pro j­
ects.
b Reviews and edits reports of co-workers to insure accuracy.
5% 5. Miscellaneous Projects As Assigned
a . May tes tify  as an expert witness in legal matters concerning 
geological problems.
b . Provides geotechnical information and assistance to outside 
agencies such as universities , Department of Fish, Wildlife and 
P arks , Departm ent of State Lands, and Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation, in solving geotechnical problems.
C . Positions S u perv ised:
A v a ry in g  number on a project basis -  most commonly three FTE's which
can include:
D irect
1 -  Geologist I 
1 -  Geologist 11 
1 -  C iv il Engineer 1 
1 -  C iv il Engineer 11 
1 -  Lab Technician I 
3 -  Core D r ill Operators  
1 -  Core D r ill O perator
Ind irect
1-2 -  Core D r ill O perator 1 
1 -  Core D rill O perator 11
I .  Complexity (mental e ffo rt)  (Factor Level F)
The work involves p lanning and conducting projects to gather and analyze 
geological inform ation in  o rder to solve geotechnical problems related to site 
selection, design specifications and the maintenance and construction of state 
highways and highw ay s tru c tu res . The position is sometimes assigned projects 
la rger than those assigned to lower level Geologists, requiring a higher level of 
planning and coordination of w ork.
-  2 -
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ous studies conducted by the Geology Section; and technical assistance orovided 
b y  the Supervisor o f the Geology Section.
These standards are generally  applicable to most situations. Due to the 
d iffic u lty  of gathering  precise data on subsurface conditions and structures and 
due to the unique natu re  o f geological conditions and formations in manv sites 
to be stud ied , professional judgement and analysis is required to modify and 
adapt inform ation g a th erin g , and analytical methods and techniques, or to 
suggest unique design recommendations. Advanced professional judgement is 
also requ ired  in p lann ing , coord inating, and review ing the technical adequacy 
of work perform ed by o ther Geologists on large projects,
2. Physical E ffo rt (Factor Level C)
Field work involves climbing and w alking on rough and steep surfaces, bending 
and lif t in g  geologic equipm ent. T h ir ty -f iv e  percent of work time is spent in 
the fie ld  and 60% o f fie ld  work involves these strenuous activities. The remain­
ing  time is spent at a desk or perform ing ligh t activities in  the field or in the 
lab while standing.
3 ..  Knowledge and Skill Level (Factor Level G2)
Dimension I -  Occupational Knowledge
A . Knowledges and skills needed at en try :
1. Knowledge of the theories, princip les , methods, and techniques of
geology perta in in g  to highway design and construction.
2. Skill in  the use of field and laboratory equipment, and in maintaining
or rep a irin g  and ca lib rating  sensitive geological instruments.
3. Knowledge of departm ent policies, procedures, standards, and 
organizational s tru c tu re .
4. Knowledge of how geotechnical design features and specifications have 
been a rriv e d  at in  designing highway structures for a broad range of 
sites w ith unique geological conditions and formations.
B . Knowledges and skills needed for fu ll performance:
Same as the knowledges and skills needed at en try .
C. E d ucatio n /T ra in ing  and experience needed:
The minimum combination of education and experience typically needed to 
acquire listed  e n try  knowledges and skills plus the ability to acquire full 
performance knowledges and skills within an acceptable time period is a
B .S .  degree in  Geology and four years experience in geotechnical data 
collection, analysis, and design work as applied to highway construction 
engineering.
Additional experience may be required  to acquire knowledge and skill 
necessary to provide leadw orker supervision on a project basis.
Dimension I I  -  Supervisory /M anageria l Knowledge
Knowledge o f the princip les and practices of leadworker supervision.
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4. Human R elations S k ills  (F a c to r Level B l )
D im ension I  *  N a tu re  o f Contacts
Norm al contacts are  w ith  personnel and professionals in the Department 
and o th e r state  and fed era l agencies to ga ther inform ation needed for field  
w ork and design ana lys is ; coord inate e ffo rts ; or to explain analysis and 
design recommendations and resolve design problem s.
Occasional contacts are  w ith  con tractors  to c la r ify  contract specifications 
fo r geotechnical con struc tion  fea tu res ; or w ith the Department legal s ta ff 
to advise on geotechnical m atters in  legal actions affecting  the department 
and to  act as an e x p e rt w itness; o r w ith p ro p e rty  owners to explain and 
make arrangem ents fo r fie ld  w ork to be done on th e ir  p ro p e rty . (Permis­
sion to conduct fie ld  w ork  is obtained b y  the Pdght-of-W ay Bureau.
Hostile  o r co n flic tu a l contacts sometimes occur when the employee is called 
in  b y  the  F ie ld  Pro ject M anager to discuss the meaning of contract specifi­
cations.
Dim ension I I  -  S ignificance o f Contact
While th is  position may occasionally be called into  a dispute or to act as an 
e x p e rt w itness , th is  occurs on ly  one o r two times annually and responsibil­
i ty  fo r reso lv in g  d isputes or s tru c tu r in g  testim ony lies elsewhere. Skill in  
h an d lin g  norm al contacts (exch an g in g  technical information and resolving  
techn ica l problem s w ith  o th e r u n its ) is im portant for effic ient problem 
reso lu tion  b u t not as c r itic a l as professional knowledge of geology and 
geotechnical d es ig n .
5 . .  Work Im pact R esp o n s ib ility  (F ac to r Level B3)
Dimension I -  Scope
The  position b en efits  people who use sections of state highways by making 
design decisions which a ffe c t the sa fe ty , d u ra b ility  and m aintainability of 
h ighw ay sections and s tru c tu re s  w ith in  assigned project areas.
Dimension I I  -  Consequences o f E rro r
I f  geological su rveys  w ere not p ro p e rly  conducted, or the results of a 
su rv e y  not p ro p e rly  analyzed or re p o rte d , o r i f  design recommendations 
w ere in ad eq u a te , geological hazards such as landslides could resu lt, water 
tables could be a ffe c te d , h ighw ay s tru c tu res  such as bridges could be 
u n s tab le , o r h ig h w ay surfaces could d eterio ra te . Since this Geologist is 
norm ally  in  ch arg e  o f g a th e rin g  geological inform ation and reporting  i t ,  
e rro rs  in  th is  phase would p ro b ab ly  not be detected. O ther work is 
rev iew ed  and fa u lty  analysis could be detected but this Geologist is con­
sidered  a techn ica l e x p e rt and most of the recommendations and analyses 
would not be questioned unless obviously outside of normal standards.
T h ir ty - f iv e  p e rce n t o f the employee’s work time involves on-the-job  safety  
tra in in g  and e n s u rin g  th a t safe w ork procedures are followed, me u m g  
core d r ill in g  p ro ced u res  and fie ld  survey  procedures. Responsi 11 les 
inc lude ch eck in g  sub ord inates  fo r p roper safety equipment an c ec ing  
w ork sites fo r  h a z a rd s . F a ilu re  to exercise these responsibilities could
-  4 -
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re s u lt in  major in ju rie s  to subordinates or co -w orkers , although  
subord inates  are also tra in e d  in , and responsible fo r , safety measures.
F a ilu re  to take  measures to p ro tec t work p ro p e rty  (inc luding locking all 
veh ic les ; p ro p e r h an d lin g  o f instrum ents in  rough te rra in  ancf on 
con struc tion  s ites; and p ro p e r m aintenance and storage o f instrum ents) 
could re s u lt in  loss or damage to equipm ent w ith an estimated value of 
$118,000 .
6. W orking Condition H ardsh ips (F ac to r Level C3)
Dim ension I  -  Physical H ardsh ips
F ie ld  w ork is perform ed outside at construction and field survey sites. I t  
enta ils  exposure to  inclem ent w eath er, d u s t, h igh noise levels and soiling 
o f c lo th in g , face , and lim bs. F ie ld  w ork is perform ed 35% of work time 
and hard sh ip s  are p resen t d u rin g  approxim ately 50% of field w ork.
Dimension XI -  Work Schedule H ardships
A lthough  the w ork  schedule is norm ally 8:00 a .m.  to 5:00 p . m . ,  approxi­
m ately five  n ig h ts  p e r month are spent away from home on state business. 
U nscheduled callups occur approxim ately  four times per year to investigate  
landslides or unusual problem s on construction sites.
7. W orking Condition Hazards (F ac to r Level C)
T h ir ty - f iv e  p ercen t o f the w ork time is spent in core d rillin g  or geological field  
s u rv e y  w o rk . D e a th , cuts ,  or b roken  bones could result from being struck by  
a veh ic le , heavy equ ipm en t, overhead equipm ent or d rill casings. Field sur­
veys could re s u lt in  serious fa lls  or being s tru ck  b y  falling rocks. In ju ry  
re q u ir in g  hospita l trea tm en t has occurred  to a sim ilarly situated employee re ­
ce n tly .
Special o n -th e -jo b  tra in in g  on p ro p e r and safe work procedures involving core 
d rillin g  rig s  and rough  te r ra in  surveys  is p ro v id ed . Hard hats, fluorescent 
vests and sa fe ty  shoes are  re q u ire d  on d r ill in g  and construction sites.
- 5 -
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BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS 24.26.502
Sub-Chapter 5 
Wage and Classification Appeals
24.26.501 PURPOSE (1) The purpose of these regula­
tions is to provide all classified employees of the State of 
Montana an orderly and uniform method to file and process 
appeals arising from the operation of the state employees' 
classification and pay plan title 2, chapter 18, MCA.
(History: Sec. 2-18-1011, MCA; IMP, 2-18-1011, MCA; NEW, Eff.
7/5/75.)
24.26.502 DEFINITIONS (1) "Employee" means any person 
employed by the state of Montana, except: elected officials 
and their chief deputy and executive secretary; officers and 
employees of the legislative branch; judges and employees of 
the judicial branch; members of boards and commissions 
appointed by the governor, appointed by the legislature or 
appointed by other elected state officials, officers or 
members of the militia; agency heads appointed by the gov­
ernor; academic and professional administrative personnel 
with individual contracts under the authority of the board 
)f regents of higher education; personal staff of the exec­
utive officials enumerated in article VI, section one of the 
constitution of Montana.
(2) "Agency" means any department, board, commission, 
office, bureau, institution or unit of state government 
recognized in the state budget.
(3) "Department" means one of the 20 principal depart­
ments within the executive branch, as provided by the consti­
tution .
(4) "Department head" means a director, commission, 
board, commissioner, or constitutional officer in charge of 
a department.
(5) "Board” means the board of personnel appeals or its
designated agent.
(6) "Personnel division" means the personnel division
of the department of administration.
(7) "Inquiry" means the process of gathering and weigliing 
evidence bearing on appeals. This process may include 
securing documents, holding individual interviews oi group 
meetings, conducting a hearing, or any combination of t e 
above.(8) "Appeal" means any conipiaint filed w i tli the boai 
of personnel appeals relating to the operation of tlie sta e 
employees' classification and pjay plan, title 2, chap er 
MCA.
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(9) "Working days" means all calender days except 
Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays.
(10) "Form" means the State Employees Classification 
and Wage Appeal Form BPA-C(l).
(11) "Formal appeals procedure" means the appeals 
procedure provided for state employees in 24.26.508. (History: 
Sec. 2-18-1011, MCA; I M F , 2-18-1011, MCA; N E W , Eff. 7/5/75.)
24.26.503 INFORMAL RESOLUTION OF APPEALS (1) The 
board encourages the personnel division and state employees 
to attempt to resolve appeals through an informal procedure 
as prescribed by the personnel division before initiating 
the formal appeals procedure. (History: Sec. 2-18-1011,
MCA; I M P , 2-18-1011, MCA; N E W , Eff. 7/5/75.)
Rules 24.26.504 through 24.26.507 Reserved
24.26.508 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE (1) Step One. Any employee, 
group of employees, or appropriately designated represenatives, 
may utilize the formal appeals procedure. The individual 
employee must obtain a State Employee Classification and Wage
Appeal Form BPA-C(i) and follow the accompanying ins tructions.
In the case of a group appeal, a group of employees must 
comply wth the rules governing group appeals (24.26.404).
Forms may be obtained from the Board of Personnel Appeals, 
Capitol Station, Helena, Montana, or from the personnel 
offices of all departments within the executive branch.
(a) The appropriate form when completed shall be submitted 
to the immediate supervisor.
(b) To complete the form, the employee must clearly 
identify the issue or issues motivating the appeal. A list 
of appealable issues will be provided wi ti: the appeal form.
The employee must explain in detail the issue and their rea­
sons for appealing. If an issue or reason for the appeal is 
not adequately identified, the appeal may be returned to the 
employee at any step in the appeal proceduie.
(c) Appealable issues are the following:
(i) The class specification doesn't adequately describe
my position duties.(ii) A different class specification is a bettei des­
cription of my position duties.(iii)The class title is inappropriate for my position.
(i V ) The minimum qua 1i fications aie not equivalent to
those required to do my job. _(V) other positions assigned to the same class have less
difficult work than my position.
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BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS 24.26.508
(vi) My position duties are more similar to positions assigned to a different class.
(vii)Other positions assigned to the same class perform 
duties significantly different than my position duties.
(viii) The Position Description for my position class 
does not adequately describe the duties and responsibilities assigned.
(ix) There are significant responsibilities assigned to 
my position which are not included in the Position Descrip­
tion.
( X )  There are significant duties described in the 
Position Description which are not performed by this position.
(xi) There is not a current Position Description available 
for my position.
(xii)The Pay Plan Rules have been incorrectly applied 
to my position (specific rule(s ) should be cited).
(xiii) (other) must specifically relate to position 
classification. _ . .
(d) The immediate supervisor shall have ten working 
days to examine the appeal, attempt to resolve the complaint, 
record his or her findings, record steps taken (if any) to 
resolve appeal, and return the form to the employee.
(e) If the immediate supervisor feels the employee 
appeal has merit, the immediate supervisor may, initiate a 
request for reclassification through the agency personnel 
office; or request an administrative review of the classifi­
cation of the employee’s position, or redescribe the position 
duties to more adequately reflect actual work performed or 
initiate and complete other steps to address the identified 
issue. The employee should continue the appeal even if 
administrative action is underway.
(f) If the employee does not accept the findings of 
the immediate supervisor, the employee shall have five 
working days to forward the evaluation and findings of the 
immediate supervisor to step two.
(2) Step Two(a) If the employee chooses to continue the appeal,
the employee shall submit the form with all appropiiate
sections completed to the department head for review.
(b) The department head shall have five working days 
to review the appeal, record his or her findings, lecoid 
steps taken to resolve the appeal, and return it to the
employee. , ■(c) If the employee does not accept the findings oi 
the department head, the employee siiall ha-^e five woiking 
days to forward the evaluation and findings of tiie d e p a r t m e n t  
head to step three.
(3) Step Three ,(a) If the employee ghooses to continue appeal.
the employee shall submit the loim, alL apptopria e oc
completed, to the Personnel Division for review.
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(b) The Personnel Division shall have 30 working days 
to review the matter, record its findings in the appropriate 
section of the form, and to issue its recommended adjustment 
and return it to the employee or the proper representative.
(c) The Personnel Division’s review and findings shall 
be limited to the issue(s) identified in Step One of the 
appeal. Any additional issues identified at Step Three will 
be addressed through informal, administrative procedures as 
determined by the Personnel Division.
(d) The Personnel Division will prepare detailed 
written findings in response to the issue(s) identified at 
step o n e .
(e) If the employee accepts the Personnel Division's 
findings and recommendation, the formal appeals procedure is 
concluded upon the implementation of the Personnel Division's 
findings and recommendations.
(f) The employee shall have 10 working days to forward 
the appeal to the board for resolution.
(4) Step Four
(a) If the employee rejects the Personnel Division's 
findings and recommendation, the employee shall submit the 
form BPA-C(l), with all appropriate sections completed, to 
the board.
(b) The employee must identify and record where they 
feel the Personnel Division's findings are in error.
(c) The board shall have 10 working days to accept or 
reject the appeal for hearing at Step Four.
(i) The board shall examine the issue(s ) and exceptions 
identified by tlie employee. If the issue(s ) and exceptions 
are adequately described, the board will accept the appeal
at Step Four.
(ii) If the board finds the issue identified at step
one to be inadequately described, the board shall return the
appeal to the employee. In such case, the employee may 
redescribe the issue and refile the appeal at step one 
within 10 working days.
(iii) If the Board feels that the Personnel Division's 
written findings or the employee's excep tions to the written
findings are not adequately described, the Board shall
return the appeal to the app rop r i a to- party. In such case, 
the party will expand its findings or exceptions and lefile 
them with the Board within 10 working days.
(d) If in the board's discretion it decides to conduct
a preliminary investigation in the appeal, it shall have 20 
days to do so. The board may carry out any investigations 
deemed necessary for resolution of the appeal or comp a m
The employee or group of employees and P e r s o n n e l  Division
shall have ten days to accept or reject the pr elin'inar y 
decision. If the employee or group ot employees an . \ . 
Personnel Division accept tire preliminary fiecision, i
be final and binding. T h e  board shall then i m p l e m e n t
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after notice is sent, the board shall appt'ove or disapprove 
the group appeal. Such decision may be conditional, and mav 
be altered or amended at any time before final determination 
by the board after a hearing.
(3) Rule 23 shall also govern notice to members of the 
group / withdrawal of a member from a g r o u p , use of his own 
counsel by a group member, the effect of board findings on a 
group, maintenance of a group action in regard to particular 
issues or subclasses, supplementary orders controlling 
conduct of the action, and dismissal or compromise of the 
a p p e a l .
(4) In a case designated as a group appeal by the 
board, the appeal shall begin at step three of the formal 
appeals procedure provided in 2 4 . 2 6 .4-0̂ -. (History: Sec.
2-18-1011, MCA; I M P , 2-18-1011, MCA; N E W , Eff. 7/5/75)
' SÛëRules 2 4 . 2 6 . 5 1 4  through 24.26.517 Reserved
24.26.518 FAILURE OF SUPERVISOR, DEPARTMENT HEAD, OR 
PERSONNEL DIVISION TO ACT WITHIN PRESCRIBED TIME LIMIT ( 1 )
If the immediate supervisor, department head, or the person­
nel division does not respond to an employee's appeal within 
the prescribed time limits in the appeals procedure, the 
employee may forward his appeal to the next step in the 
appeals procedure by forwarding his original copy of form 
BPA-C(l) and a new copy of form BP.A-C(l) to the next step 
within five days of the expiration of the time limit. 
(History: Sec 2-18-1011, MCA; I M P , 2-18-1011, MCA; NEV/ Eff.
7 / 5 / 7 5 . " )
Rules 24.26.517 through 24.26.522 Reserved
2 4.26.523 FILING OF A N EW PETITION FOR HEARING AFTER 
FINAL ORDER ISSUED (1) After a final order concerning a 
position has been issued by the board, a new hearing will be 
granted only upon a showing of some substantial change in 
that position which was not considered at the prior hearing 
and which would warrant a new hearing by the board.
(2) The employee shall include with his petition a 
signed affidavit stating the substantial change.
(3) The petition and the affidavit shall procci^d through 
the appeals procedure as prescribed in ARM 24.26.508 up to
step four b . ,(4) The staff stiall then conduct a pucliminary investi­
gation to determine if tlie alleged substantial change wai
rants a new hearing. _ , ,(a) If it is determined that the alleged substantia
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change warrants a new hearing, the appeal procedure shall 
proceed as prescribed in ARM 24.26.508.
( b )  If it is determined that the alleged substantial 
change does not warrant a new hearing, the petition shall be 
d i s m i s s e d .
(5) The order to dismiss shall be an appealable order. 
(History: Sec. 2-18-1011, MCA; I MP, 2-18-3011, MCA; NEW, Eff.
12/4/76.)
Rules 24.26.524 through 24.26.529 Reserved
24.26.530 FREEDOM FROM INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT. 
COERCION, OR RETALIATION (1) If an employee's supervisor, 
or the agency for which the employee works, directly or 
indirectly interferes, restrains, coerces or retaliates 
against an employee because the employee has filed or 
attempted to file a grievance with the board, the employee 
shall be entitled to file a complaint with the board.
(2) The complaint shall be in writing and shall contain 
a clear and concise statement of facts constituting the al­
leged interference, restraint, coercion or retaliation.
(3) The Board shall serve the complaint upon the 
employee's supervisor or the agency for which the employee 
works and the supervisor or agency shall have ten days from 
the date of service of the complaint upon them to respond to 
the complaint.
(4) After ten days have elapsed from the date of service 
of the complaint, the board shall commence with step four d 
of the formal appeals procedure. (History: Sec. 2-18-1011, 
MCA; IMP, 2-18-1011, MCA; N E W , Eff. 7/5/75; A M D , 1984 MAR
p . 599, Eff. 4/13/84.)
NEXT TAGE IS 24-1719 
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